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This paper, ‘The WTO Antidumping Code: Issues for Review in Post-Doha 
Negotiations’ by Aradhna Aggarwal has been prepared under the guidance of Professor 
Anwarul Hoda. The study was part of the research programme on the WTO-related 
issues, funded by the Sir Ratan Tata Trust. 
 
This paper addresses some of the issues concerning antidumping that need to be 
reviewed in the Post-Doha Negotiations to make the antidumping agreement (ADA) 
more precise and less discretionary. Specifically, the author tries to identify the provision 
of the ADA that need to be clarified and improved for the perspective of India’s interest.  
The author covers a number of issues concerning dumping determination, injury findings, 
procedural aspects of the ADA and special and differential treatment for developing 
countries fairly extensively. While doing so, she draws on the experiences of Indian 
exporters in antidumping investigations carried out against them in the US and the EU 
and the rulings given by panels and appellate bodies in various antidumping cases in the 
Dispute Settlement Body. 
 
I have no doubt that this paper will generate more debates on this very important 
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According to the GATT principle of ‘most favoured nation’ treatment, trade must 
be conducted on the basis of non- discrimination between members of the WTO. ‘Like 
products’ must be taxed the same way and placed under similar entry conditions. 
However, in some circumstances, a country may temporarily break this principle and 
impose higher protection against import of one or more goods from one or more 
countries. This arrangement termed ‘contingent protection’ may be used by the 
governments to protect their domestic producers from unfair competition. Contingent 
protection measures fall under three categories – antidumping, countervailing and 
safeguard measures. Of these antidumping remains the most commonly used contingent 
protection measure. It proliferated in the 1990s and is now used extensively by developed 
and developing countries alike.  
 
Broadly speaking a product is said to have been dumped if it is introduced into the 
commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the product and it 
causes/threatens material injury to an established industry of the country. Though the 
concept in itself appears to be simple, it is subject to several complexities at the 
operational level. There are ambiguities in the very definition of dumping and in every 
step of calculating dumping and injury margin and that such ambiguities facilitate 
dumping findings (see, Tharakan 1991, 1999 Tharakan and Waelbroeck 1994 among 
several others). The antidumping policies of most countries (developed and developing 
both) have been criticised by both lawyers and economists (Aggarwal 2002a, Murray and 
Rousslang 1989, Lindsey 2000, Araujo et. al 2001, Jackson and Vermulst 1989, Tharakan 
1994,1995, Didier 2001, Hsu 1998, Almstedt and Norton 2000 among others). The 
present paper however argues that it is difficult to define general policy guidelines that 
would make antidumping more rational within the existing international rules. GATT 
rules are themselves in need of reform. This law is vague and that this vagueness has 
allowed the authorities to have their own interpretation of the law. It is therefore 
important to review legal provisions and conduct of the Antidumping Agreement (ADA) 
in order to see what provisions need to be clarified and improved. This is all the more so 
in view of the fact that the revision of the GATT ADA is on the agenda of the Post- Doha 
Negotiations.  
 
Critics of the antidumping legislation argue that there is little economic argument 
that can support the practice of antidumping. Antidumping law is fundamentally flawed 
and its reform cannot be found in the details of its code. Further fine-tuning and refining 
of the antidumping policy is not the answer to prevent its (mis)use. They believe that the 
Doha Round would be a good occasion to take bold initiatives that aim at changing the 
basic framework of the AD mechanism (see, Aggarwal 2003 for a detailed discussion). 
One must however bear in mind that serious objections to any such efforts will come up 
as the decision of the Ministerial Conference of the WTO at Doha emphasises the   2
preservation of the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of this agreement, its 
instruments and its objectives. Doha Declaration Article 28 mandates members to enter 
into ‘negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines’ under the SCM and 
Antidumping Agreement. This study therefore will address, within the perimeter of these  
limitations, some of the issues concerning antidumping that need to be reviewed in the 
Post-Doha Negotiations to make the ADA more precise and less discretionary. In 
particular, the objective of the study will be to identify the provisions of the Agreement 
that need to be clarified and improved from the perspective of India's interest. The study 
will heavily draw on three sources of information: one, antidumping investigations 
carried out against Indian exporters in the United States; antidumping proceedings 
against Indian exporters in the European Union (EU); and three, Dispute Settlement cases 
on antidumping, in general.  
 
The study is organised in four parts. Part I dwells upon issues concerning 
dumping determination, Part II deals with injury-related provisions while Part III   
discusses provisions related with other procedural aspects of the ADA. Finally Part IV 
examines the issue of special and differential treatment for developing countries. 
 
I.    Dumping Determination 
1.   Like product 
 
A proper identification of ‘like product’ based on economic considerations is the 
first step in calculating the normal value.  The agreement (Art. 2.6) defines like product 
as a 
‘product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under 
consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, 
although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of 
the product under consideration’.  
This definition of like product leaves much to the discretion of the authorities. 
Several instances may be cited to illustrate this point. In the Sulphanic Acid case against 
India, the EC treated the technical and purified grades of the acid as one single product. 
Several parties claimed that the definition of the product concerned was incorrect. They 
argued that the technical and purified grades of the acid were substantially different  in 
terms of  their purity and had different properties and applications. Whilst the purified 
acid could be used in all applications, the same could not be said of technical grade acid 
because of the level of impurities that it contained. The authorities however argued that 
the purification process does not alter the molecular properties of the compound. 
Therefore technical and purified grades share the same chemical characteristics. The 
authorities did not consider the fact that interchangeability was only in one direction in 
certain applications, sufficient justification that purified and technical grades constituted  
different products. In the Polyster Staple Fibre (PSF) case  exporting parties argued that 
a differentiation should be made between PSF types used for spinning applications and 
PSF used for non-spinning application because of different specific physical 
characteristics and limited interchangeability. The EC however did not find the available   3
evidence sufficient to allow a product differentiation on this basis. In the Polyethylene 
Terephthalate Film (PET film) case against India investigated by the EC, exporting 
producers argued that metallised PET film should be excluded from the product scope of 
the current proceedings on the ground that metallised PET film cannot be considered 
alike to base PET film since it had different physical and technical characteristics, 
required different production equipments and processes, being consequently more 
expensive to produce and thus sold at a higher price. These parties also argued that the 
use of metallised PET film is different from that of base PET film. The authorities 
however, felt that the metallisation process does not alter the basic physical technical and 
chemical characteristics and that base and metallised PET film are in many applications 
interchangeable and may have similar uses. It was noted that an additional production 
step required for the production of metallised PET film with resulting higher cost of 
production and sales price, is not an element which could justify per se the exclusion of a 
certain type of PET film from the scope of the product. Interestingly, United States’ 
Department of Commerce (USDOC) in the AD investigation against PET  film 
originating in India excluded from the scope of the investigation, metallised film  and 
other finished films that had one of their surfaces modified by the application of a 
performance enhancing resinous. 
 
In many cases, Indian exporters argued that the Community producers were 
producing more specialised product while Indian exporters were exporting mainly 
standardised products. They thus claimed that the product concerned which they 
produced and sold was not interchangeable and not comparable as such with the 
Community produced products. In the Hot –Rolled Flat Steel Products (1758/2000) case 
against India for instance, exporting producers claimed that the product concerned which 
they produced and sold was not interchangeable and not comparable as such with the 
Community produced product. They claimed that the production process of the 
Community producers was more advanced and even used different technology thus 
producing a higher quality product. They further pointed out that users sometimes had to 
re-roll the imported products before they could be processed further and thus claimed that 
their product was not a like product to that of the complaining community producers. The 
Commission admitted that the products were not identical but it argued that ‘this cannot 
lead to the conclusion that hot-rolled coil imported from the countries concerned were not 
a like product to that produced by the community industry’.  In the Steel Ropes and 
Cables (SWR) case  Indian exporters argue that the community was producing more 
specialised SWR while exporters were exporting mainly commodity SWR. The 
community suggested that while SWR in the top end and in the bottom end are clearly 
not interchangeable, SWR in the adjoining groups are interchangeable. Given this overlap 
between groups, no clear dividing line could be established and therefore all SWR were 
considered to be one product. 
 
The above instances suggest that within the existing framework the authorities 
enjoy wide discretion to define the scope of product under investigation. There is both the 
incentive and the opportunity to manipulate the category of like products in order to 
achieve specific goals. If ‘like product’ is defined in a too strict a way then it may lead to 
imposition of duties in cases where it should not. If, on the contrary, the relevant market   4
is defined too broadly then duties will not be applied when they should be (Hoekman and 
Mavroidis 1996). In the interest of legal certainty therefore the scope of manipulation 
should be limited. Rules need to provide a more rational and disciplined framework to 
define the scope of product under investigation. 
 
The market based approach taken by the Panels and Appellate Body in the Liquor 
Taxes cases to the determination of like products  in the context of Article III.2  could be 
useful for the determination of like product in the antidumping field. The Liquor Taxes 
cases
1 emphasised that what counts in defining like products is competition in the market 
place which is determined from the consumer’s perspective. Products that do not compete 
simply cannot be like products. According to this view, showing that directly competitive 
and substitutable products are like products should be a starting point in the 
determination of like product. Products that are not in direct competition should be 
excluded from the definition of like products even though they might be physically 
similar. Thus the focus needs to be on substitutability.   
 
Treating market factors as the starting point could provide a way for AD 
authorities to address the problem of high quality high priced imports that also fall into 
the same category as dumped imports. The famous ‘Bed Linen Case’ may illustrate this 
point. In this case, an Indian exporter of luxury bed linen was also subject to AD duties 
even though the bed linen he exported was at the top of the range and was many times 
more expensive than standard bed sheets and being so much more expensive consumers 
could not easily substitute between them. The use of market factors could therefore result 
in altogether different decision. Thus when quality differences translate to large price 
differences it will be possible to argue that the two products are not in direct competition 
with each other. It is therefore suggested that the definition of ‘like products’ needs 
reconsideration. A mere reference to similarities in physical characteristics or even ‘uses’ 
is not enough. Crucial is whether from a consumer’s perspective ‘like products’ are 
sufficiently competitive or substitutable. Showing that products are directly 
competitive/substitutable could be a starting point for the ‘like product’ determination in 
antidumping. In that regard, the use of  economic analysis and concepts including basic 
actors such as cross –price demand elasticities could prove to be useful (see, Hoekman 
and Mavroidis 1996).  
 
Article 15.2 of Rules on Custom Valuation  defines ‘similar goods’ as goods 
which although not alike in all respects, have like characteristics and like component 
materials which enable them to perform the same functions and to be commercially 
interchangeable. The WTO ADA may be amended along similar lines. 
 
Adding ‘...directly competitive/substitutable product....’ (added emphasis) to the 




                                                 
1 Japanese Liquor Case II (1996) and Korean Liquor Taxes (1998).   5
2.   Use of constructed normal value 
 
Article 2.2 of the ADA establishes the framework within which an investigating 
authority is to determine the normal value to be compared with the export price. It 
establishes a presumption that normal value will be the representative market price in the 
exporter’s country. It may not however always be possible to use the actual information 
on normal price and the investigating authorities may have to construct normal price. 
Article  2.2  lists three situations in which the investigating authorities may reject the use 
of sales in the domestic market of the exporter in the calculation of normal value. What 
follows are some major issues concerning these situations. 
 
Five percent viability test 
 
One situation in which normal values are constructed is when there is low volume 
of the sales in the domestic markets of the exporting country. Home market sales will 
normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value 
when the similar product destined for the home market of the exporting country 
constitutes 5 % or more of the sales of the product under consideration destined for sale 
in importing country. The 5% criterion is an arbitrary one without any economic rationale 
behind it. However, any proposal to drop this provision is likely to meet a stiff opposition 
within the framework of the Doha mandate. The provision may therefore be reviewed and 
modified to make it less restrictive. Here we argue that this check may be performed at 
two different levels: 
 
1.  total domestic sales of like product  vs total exports of like products 
2.  domestic sales of each particular model/type/category vs exports of 
that particular model/type. 
 
The law does not specify which of the above two is preferable or is referred to. In 
the EC, the rule of 5% is applied at both these levels. Didier (2001) observed that in most 
cases the requirement fails to meet at the model/type level and this provides the 
authorities an opportunity to use constructed value. It may therefore be suggested that the 
5% rule should not be applied at the model/type level. It requires a manufacturer to sell 
each model/ type of the like product exported on the domestic markets also, irrespective 
of the local demand. Thus, viability of the domestic sales needs to be assessed at the like 
product level only. In this context, Report of the Appellate Body in the Bed linen case 
from India has important implications. The Appellate Body (AB) noted that  
...from the wording of Article 2.1 ,it is clear to us that the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement concerns the dumping of a product......  
While commenting on the calculation of dumping margins by the EC, the AB argued  
‘The European Communities clearly identified cotton-type bed linen as the 
product under investigation in this case. Having defined the product as it did, the 
European Communities was bound to treat that product consistently thereafter in 
accordance with that definition. We see nothing in Article 2.4.2 or in any other 
provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that provides for the establishment of   6
"the existence of margins of dumping" for types or models of the product under 
investigation; to the contrary, all references to the establishment of "the 
existence of margins of dumping" are references to the product that is subject of 
the investigation.’ 
This judgement has important implications for other AD provisions, as well, 
including the five percent viability test. For instance, footnote under Article 2.2 of the 
ADA states 
‘Sales of the like product destined for consumption ...... shall normally be 
considered a sufficient quantity ...... if such sales constitute  5% or more of the 
sales of the product under consideration....’  
There is thus nothing in this provision to support the notion that, in an anti-
dumping investigation, two different stages are envisaged or distinguished in any way by 
this provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, nor to justify the distinctions made among 
types or models of the same product on the basis of these "two stages".  Clearly, viability 
of the domestic market ought to be assessed at the like product level only.  
 
In the light of the above AB judgement, it is important to review  footnote 2 under 
article 2.2 of the ADA and amend it to provide that the 5% domestic sales shall be calculated 
against export sales of the like product (not model/type/category).  
 
Sales in the ordinary course of trade 
 
Where there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the 
domestic market of the exporting country, investigating authorities may choose to 
construct the normal value. Sales of the like products in the domestic markets of the 
exporting country at prices below per unit cost (plus administrative and selling costs) 
may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of trade and may be disregarded in 
determining normal value only if such sales are made within an extended period normally 
one year (but not less than six months) in substantial quantities ( i.e. they represent not 
less than 20% of the total transaction volume) and are at prices which do not provide for 
the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time.  
 
According to the wordings of this provision (Article 2.2.1),  
‘ Sales of the like product ....may be treated as not being in the ordinary course 
of trade if ......such sales... are at prices which do not provide for recovery....’. 
Clearly, the condition applies to the product under investigation and not the 
type/model. The EC however makes model-wise comparison of the cost of production to 
the home market prices. The USDOC on the other hand compares the adjusted weighted 
average cost of production to the home market sales of the foreign like product in order to 
determine whether these sales have been made at prices below the cost of production. It is 
important to streamline the practice in the use of this provision.  In the light of the 
Appellate Body ruling in the  
Bed Linen Case Footnote to Article 2.2.1 should be clarified and amended as ‘ Sales 
of product (not type/model) (with emphasis added) below per unit costs are substantial if 
...........the volume of sales below per unit cost represents not less than 20% ......     7
In the context of Article 2.2.1, there is another peculiar practice adopted by the 
EC. In cases where per product type the volume of sales above unit cost represented 80% 
or more, the normal value was established on the basis of the weighted average price of 
total  domestic sales transactions. In cases where per product type the volume of sales 
above unit cost represented less than 80% but more than 10% of the total sales volume, 
the normal value for this type was established on the basis of the weighted average price 
of profitable domestic sales transactions only. Where per unit cost represented less than 
10% of total sales above the  cost  then all domestic sales are considered insufficient, 
price data on domestic sales are discarded and, the use of constructed normal value is 
made. This practice is contrary to the spirit of Article 2.2.1 which clearly states to 
disregard only those sales that are not in ordinary course of trade  provided they 
constitute more than 20% of domestic sales. Wordings of Article 2.2.1 need to be 
tightened to restrain such practices that result into the use of constructed normal value.  
 
Foot note to Article 2.2.1 may further be clarified by adding ‘...only sales not in 
ordinary course of trade are to be disregarded...’.  
 
Sales to domestic related customers 
 
The current AD agreement does not specifically address the issue whether home 
market sales to affiliates may be included in or excluded from the calculation of normal 
value. Article 2.2.1 sets forth a method determining whether sales between any two 
parties are within the ordinary course of trade however it does not address the more 
specific issue of sales to related parties. Article 2.3 directs investigating authorities to 
construct export prices at ex-factory level when exports take place via related importers. 
However, the law has no provision for adjustments in normal value when sales are made 
through affiliates (as discussed above). As a result, export prices constructed at the ex-
factory level is generally compared with domestic sales prices to the first unrelated buyer 
without effective adjustments. This creates (as reported above also) asymmetry between 
the level of trade of the constructed export price and that of the normal value. Some 
illustrations may be given. 
 
Under the EC interpretation, a product is sold in the ordinary course of trade on 
the domestic market only where sold to an unrelated domestic customer. Hence in many 
cases the reference price is the first resale price by a related distributor to unrelated 
customers. This gives upward bias to normal value as ‘further downstream in the 
domestic distribution chain the reference price is taken the higher it is. Those who sell 
direct to the related consumers are better placed than those who sell via a captive network 
in domestic markets. Thus the structure of domestic sales affects the dumping margin 
calculations and in this process, the producers who sell through subsidiaries are penalised 
(See, Didier 2001). The US Commerce also ignores sales to affiliated parties in 
calculating normal value. Instead, it uses the first resale price by the distributor/dealer to 
unrelated consumer as the normal value. In the ‘Certain hot rolled steel products from 
Japan’ case however Japan raised this issue at the WTO level. The Panel noted that 
downstream sales made by affiliates of exporters/producers though in the ordinary course 
of trade has no relevance because they are not sales of the  exporters for whom normal 
value is calculated. The Panel found support for this view in Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of the   8
Anti-Dumping Agreement, which provide alternative methods of calculating, 
respectively, normal value and export price. While Article 2.3 expressly allows the use of 
downstream sales where the "export price is unreliable because of association", Article 
2.2 is silent as to whether the use of downstream sales is a permitted alternative method 
of calculating "normal value ". (emphasis added) The Panel could "see no basis" for 
concluding that, because Article 2.3 allows the use of downstream sales to construct 
export price, it must also be possible to use a similar method to "construct" normal value. 
In other words, the Panel ruled to exclude sales to related parties as not being made in the 
ordinary course of trade.  The Appellate Body however reversed the Panel judgement. In 
its view identity of the seller is no ground for precluding downstream transactions and 
that the authorities may make allowances under Article 2.4 to arrive at a price that is 
comparable with the export price. The AB therefore ruled that in the case of sales to a 
related party, domestic prices may be adjusted at the same level of trade as export prices.  
Thus the unfairness described above could be corrected by level of trade adjustments 
guaranteeing  that domestic and export prices are comparable.  
 
It is however observed that investing authorities are highly restrictive in granting 
level of trade allowances. Therefore, we suggest here that Article 2.2 should have a 
provision on the normal value of sales that are made through affiliated parties. This 
provision need to be complemented by a sentence that makes it clear that prices to related 
parties may be held as not being made in the  ordinary course of trade only where 
authorities demonstrate  that they are affected by the relationship. In this context, it is 
important to note that prices charged to related parties are generally assumed to be lower 
than the prices to unaffiliated customers. This is because those who sell directly to 
unrelated customers may have to incur costs in marketing functions while those who sell 
domestically via a captive network do not perform such functions themselves. USDOC 
carries out a test termed ‘arm’s length test or 99.5% test on the basis of this assumption, 
to determine whether home market sales to affiliates are made in the ordinary course of 
trade. If prices to the affiliated party are on average 99.5% or more of the price to the 
unaffiliated parties, the Commerce determines that sales made to the affiliated party are at 
arms’ length. This practice has been used by the USDOC in all AD cases. Indian 
exporters have also been subject to this practice (see for instance, Certain Hot rolled 
carbon steel plates from India’ case). In the certain hot rolled steel products case 
however Japan  questioned this practice in the DSB. Their argument was : this law treats 
low prices as abnormal but ignores that high prices can also be abnormal skewing normal 
value upwards. The AB agreed with this argument and found the application of the 99.5% 
test inconsistent with the term ordinary course of trade due to the distortion that it is 
likely to introduce in the calculation of the normal value. It argued that Article 2.1 applies 
to any sales not in the ordinary course of trade and not just sales that lower normal value.  
 
Thus, a provision may be appended stating that ‘when domestic sales are not in 
ordinary course of trade because of association or a compensatory arrangement between 
the manufacturer and the domestic distributor or a third party, and the domestic price is 
demonstrated (emphasis added) to be affected by the relationship (resulting in high/low 
prices), the normal value shall be constructed  on the basis of the price  at which the 
products are first resold to an independent buyer by adjusting that for costs (including taxes   9
and duties) incurred between manufacturer’s sales to distributors and resale and distributor’s 
profits accrued’.  
 
This however requires an appropriate definition of ‘affiliation’. There is no clear 
definition of ‘affiliation’ in the ADA. Footnote 11 provides the definition of affiliation in 
the context of determining the domestic industry. The concept of related producers in the 
agreement depends on control. While defining ‘control’ the law stipulates that ‘one shall 
be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to 
exercise restraint or direction over the latter’. The law is thus vague and does not provide 
any specific criteria to define control. The interpretation of this concept is at the 
discretion of investigating authorities. For instance, the EC continues to deem the 
existence of control even in the case of minimal shareholding of 1% to 5%. It is therefore 
important to provide a clear definition of affiliation for all practical purposes. Article 15.4 
of the ‘Rules on Custom Valuation’ provides a comparatively more elaborate definition of 
affiliation for the purpose of that Agreement. For this agreement it states, persons shall be 
deemed to be related only if 
 
(a)  they are officers of one another’s business; 
(b)  they are legally recognised partners in their business; 
(c)  they are employer and employee; 
(d)  any person directly/indirectly owns, controls or holds 5% or more of the 
outstanding voting stock or shares of both of them; 
(e)  one of them directly/indirectly controls the other; 
(f)  both of them are directly controlled by a third person; 
(g)  they are members of the same family. 
 
The criteria provided in this provision (Article 15.4 of the Rules on Custom Valuation) 
may be reviewed and  refined for the inclusion in the ADA.  
 
3  Construction of the normal value 
 
Alternative methods for constructing normal value have been provided in the 
ADA. One, the authorities may use the cost of production in the country of origin plus a 
reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits. Two, the 
authorities may use the price of goods exported to third countries adjusted for  the 
differences in terms and conditions of sale, in taxation and other differences relating to 
price comparability between the goods sold to the importing countries and the like goods 
sold by the exporter to importers in the third country, in a prescribed manner. Three, in 
the absence of  information on actual price and costs, investigating authority, for 
constructing normal values, rely on the best available information. All these methods are 




   10
Use of cost of production methodology 
 
Start up Operation and Non recurring items of costs 
 
The ADA generally provides for costs adjustment for those non-recurring items of 
cost which benefit future and/or current production, or for circumstances in which costs 
during the period of investigation are affected by start-up operations’. The provision is 
subject to different interpretations with regard to the treatment of the non-recurring costs, 
treatment in case of start up operations and the length of a start up operation.  The law 
directs authorities to ignore when computing normal values abnormally high costs and or/ 
losses in domestic prices where production is in a start up phase. The Agreement 
provides that in case of start-up operations, the cost at the end of the start-up period will 
be taken into account, which generally would be the time when the cost of production in 
the new line would have stabilised. However, if the start-up period extends beyond the 
investigation period, the most recent cost will be taken into account.  
 
No limit is made in the text with respect to the circumstances considered, the 
types of costs or the types of operations or the types of adjustments. It is thus not clear if 
this applies to start up losses due only to the new production facilities or the launching of 
new products within old facilities is also to be taken into account. It is also not clear what 
costs are included in this special regime? Does it include start up overheads or R&D 
expenditure? EC allows respondents to claim for adjustments for new production 
facilities only. Furthermore, it does not allow for R&D expenditures or start up sales 
expenses. The US legislation however allows adjustments for start up operations where a 
producer is using new production facilities or producing a new product where substantial 
investments are required and where  production levels are limited by technical factors 
associated with the initial phase of production. These conditions are somewhat 
generalised and may allow for any number of start up scenarios. In several instances ( 
such as Stainless wires case investigated by the EC,  Preserved Mushroom Case, 
administrative Review by the USDOC) Indian exporting producers which sustained 
losses throughout the investigation period claimed that these losses had occurred during 
the start up phase and that this should be taken into account. However, the investing 
authorities rejected their claim. It is therefore important to clarify Article 2.2.1.1 in the 
light of the experience of different countries by examining ambiguities and their effects 
on the computation of dumping margins. 
 
The USDOC has recently incorporated into the regulation concepts from the SAA 
836-838 that help to define startup operations and explain startup adjustments. It includes 
definition of new products, new production facilities, as well as guidance whether 
improvement to products or expansion to facilities qualify for startup operations. SAA also 
provides guidelines on the determination of duration of start up period, adjustments for start 
up operations and amortisation of startup operations. These provisions may be examined to 
clarify Article 2.2.1.1. 
 
   11
Computation of sales and general administration expenses and reasonable 
profits 
 
For constructing the normal value, investigating authorities adjust the cost data by 
a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits. When 
the amounts for administrative, selling and general costs (SGA) and for profits cannot be 
determined on the basis of actual information, investigating authorities have a complete 
discretion to choose (i) profits and SGA either of the exporter in question  in respect of 
production and sales in the same general category of product or (ii) of any other 
exporter/producer subject to investigation in respect of production and sales of the like 
product in the domestic market of the country of origin or (iii) any other reasonable 
method. The EC frequently bases normal profits on the domestic profit made by (an) 
other manufacturer(s) of the like product.  
 
Clearly, the current law under which the authorities have complete discretion may 
lead to substantial bias in the calculation of normal values. Moreover, this approach is 
often unfair as different producers of a like product often incur significantly different 
SGA/profits from each other either because they are selling different types of like 
products or because they have different cost efficiency. Lindsey (2000) has observed that 
the profit rates used by the US Commerce in constructed value are frequently much 
higher than any conceivable norm. He gave a few examples where he compared the profit 
rates actually used by Commerce to the average profit rates of the equivalent US 
industries during the year  
 
 
Table 1.   Comparison of USDOC profit rates and US industry profit rates: Some 
illustrations 
Investigation  Commerce rate (%) US industry rate (%)
Dinnerware from Taiwan  25.77  5.23 
Brake drums and Rotors from China  12.50  5.93 
Cut-to-length steel plate from China  10.14  3.43 
Dinnerware from Indonesia  22.61  5.23 
Collated roofing nails from China  20.50  7.20 
Source: Lindsey (2000) 
 
the respective initiations were made. He found that the difference between them 
ranged between 6.57% to as large as 20.7%. Thus, unrealistic normal profits and /or SGA 
costs, may introduce serious ambiguities in the calculation of constructed normal value. 
Another illustration is provided by the cotton bed linen case investigated by the EC. In 
this case the EC had constructed normal value for most exporters using for all of them a 
profit margin of 18.65% found to have been obtained by an Indian producer on his 
domestic sales for a limited volume of the product concerned. It is therefore important to 
impose an obligation to apply a separate reasonability test to methodologies set  forth in 
Article 2.2.2 (i) to (iii). Our suggestion is that 
   12
Article 2(6) as a whole would need to be safeguarded by a general reasonability test 
such as has been foreseen only for Article 2(6)(iii) now. The definition of reasonable could be 
the same as that which has been implied in Article 2(6) (iii) itself i.e. profits should not 
exceed profits normally realised by sales of other producers in the same general category of 
products on the domestic markets. If the methodologies set forth in Article 2.2.2 (i) to (iii) are 
by definition reasonable at most there is a rebuttable presumption that the results generated 
by these methodologies are reasonable 
 
One may note that leaving in ‘any other reasonable method’ in Article 2.2.2 (iii) 
even with the status of last priority will continue to cause problems. However, we do not 
propose to drop this provision altogether. In our view it is a residual method that may be 
used by the authorities when other methods fail. 
 
Another gap in Article 2.2.2 that needs to addressed is the options provided in the 
Article have no preferential significance. In the Cotton linen dispute Case, India argued 
that rather than using profits and SGA of any other exporter/producer subject to 
investigation in respect of production and sales of the like product in the domestic market 
of the country of origin (Article 2.2.2 ii) the EC should have used profits and SGA of the 
exporter in question  in respect of production and sales in the same general category of 
product (Article 2.2.2 i). The Panel however asserted that the provision does not entail 
any preference of one option over others, the mere order in which the options appear in 
this Article has no preferential significance. The Panel further noted ‘Certainly we would 
have expected something more than simply a numbered list’ but concluded that under the 
present law Members have complete discretion as to which of the three methodologies 
they use in their investigations’. Against this background, it is suggested that 
 
Article 2.2.2 of the ADA should be amended to set out an order of preference among 
different methodologies of approximating profits. The use of Article 2.2.2 (iii) which provides 
for ‘any other reasonable method’ without specifying such method needs to be given the last 
priority.  
 
Constructed normal value - Use of Appropriate third country 
method 
 
The law stipulates that the authorities may also use the price of goods exported to 
third countries to construct normal values adjusted for  the differences in terms and 
conditions of sale, in taxation and other differences relating to price comparability 
between the goods sold to the importing countries and the like goods sold by the exporter 
to importers in the third country, in a prescribed manner. Where the ‘third country 
approach’ is used it is usually the ‘third country’ suggested by the complainants that is 
retained by the investigating authorities for the calculations. In many cases therefore, 
finding dumping is a forgone conclusion. Moreover, price to any third country may not 
be a comparable representative price due to different market conditions and different 
demand elasticities. It is therefore important to have a well defined criteria for choosing 
‘appropriate third country’.  
In this case also specific criteria in terms of economic parameters may be a welcome 
precision. 
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Constructed normal value - best available information 
 
Article 6.8 states  
‘In the cases in which any interested party refuses access to or otherwise does 
not provide necessary information with a reasonable period or significantly 
impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or 
negative may be made on the basis of the facts available’.  
Investigating authorities frequently rely on ‘facts available’ method for 
calculating dumping margins. This method increases the probability of finding dumping.  
Blonigen (2003)  analysed all  company-specific cases investigated between 1980 and 
1995 to examine the methodology adopted by US Commerce in determining normal 
value. He found that  affirmative findings were made for 631 companies in all over this 
period. Of these, 201 were based on ‘the best available information’. Aside from this, 15 
Indian exporters faced dumping charges. Affirmative findings for 11 of them were made 
on the basis of the ‘best available information’.  
 
Table 2.   Summary of methodologies adopted for constructing normal value by 
USDOC: 1980-1995 
Best information   
Complete Partial
CP Export NME  total 
Cases (company-wise)  with 
affirmative  Findings  
195 6 33 19 84 631
Cases against India   11 - 1 1 -  15 
(6cases)
Note:   CP: cost of production method; Export : third country export data; NME : Non market economy 
Sources: Blonigen (2003) 
 
In another exercise, Lindsey (2000) examined all US Commerce company-
specific AD investigations from 1995 through 1998. He found that Commerce made 
affirmative findings for 107 of the 141 companies investigated over this period. Of the 
141 total determinations 36 were based on facts available . What is more interesting to 
note is that in all the cases based on facts available , the Commerce made affirmative 
dumping findings. The success rate was 50% for those companies for which the 
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Average dumping margin  
for affirmative findings (%) 
Best information  36
(36)
95.58 
Constructed value  20
(14)
35.70 















Source: Lindsey (2000) 
 
Thus there has been an overwhelming use of ‘facts available’ and this apparently 
introduces bias in favour of affirmative dumping findings. 
 
The use of ‘fact available’ not only increases the probability of affirmative finding 
but  also results in higher dumping margins. Baldwin and Moore (1991) find that the use 
of ‘facts available’ nearly doubles the average US dumping margin from around 35% to 
over 65%. Lindsey (2000) has shown that  the average dumping margin in the cases 
based on facts available had been as high as 95.58% against the average 58.79%  in all 
the affirmative findings. In contrast, in the four cases that were based on the actual price 
data, average margin was just 7.36%! 
 
A review of the antidumping cases suggests that any failure by the foreign firms 
to respond to the authorities’ onerous reporting requirements allows the authority to 
disregard all its data and instead use the best information available, which typically 
means data reported in the domestic firm's petition.  This may very well be illustrated by 
the Steel plate case against India investigated by the US Commerce. Initially, the 
USDOC had problems with the originally submitted  electronic databases which was 
formatted incorrectly and was incomplete. The Commerce issued several supplemental 
questionnaires. Though the subject firm did respond to all of them, the Commerce found 
it difficult to evaluate the  responding exporter’s (SAIL) selling practices . On product 
specific costs SAIL admitted that the company did not maintain costs on the product 
specific basis as required by the questionnaire but it did report different costs for different 
products using certain cost allocation. The Commerce however expressed its doubts over 
the reliability of these figures and finally, discarded all information provided by the 
exporter and used instead the information provided by the petitioners. The case was   15
referred to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  India argued that the US should have 
resorted to facts available only with respect to particular categories of information that 
were either flawed/not available. India asserted that the USDOC always applied total 
facts available in particular factual circumstances. The US argued that  the Agreement 
permits an investigating authority to resort to facts available for all aspects of its 
determination if some necessary information is not provided without considering the 
information actually submitted. The Panel did not accept the US position and concluded 
that the authority must use every element  of information submitted which satisfies the 
provision of Annex II and that members do not have unlimited right to reject all 
information submitted in a case where necessary information is not provided.  In the 
Argentina- AD measures on Carton-Board imports from Germany and Ceramic floor 
tiles from Italy case the Panel concluded that the investigating authority may not 
disregard information and resort to facts available under Article 6.8 on the ground that a 
party has failed to provide sufficient supporting documentation in respect of information 
provided unless the investigating authority has clearly requested that party provide such 
supporting documents. In the US- AD measures on certain hot rolled steel products 
from Japan, the AB clarified that the application of Article 6.8 is not confined to cases 
where there is no information available whatsoever and where the entire margin is 
established using only facts available. Authorities can have recourse to this Article for 
remedying the lack of any necessary information. The panel also defined the factors that 
may be taken care of while deciding whether information is  submitted within reasonable 
period of time.  In this case, the Panel and the AB also rejected the automatic recourse to 
‘facts available’ where deadlines are missed. It stated 
‘..... a rigid adherence to such deadlines does not in all cases suffice  as the basis 
for the conclusion that the information was not submitted within a reasonable 
period  and consequently that facts available may be applied... particularly 
where information is submitted in time to be verified or actually could be verified 
....it should generally be accepted..... 
In view of the fact that Article 6.8 has been referred repeatedly at the WTO level, 
clarifications in this Article could be brought to the effect that the authorities would use 
facts available with respect to that element of information that has not been provided’.  
 
It may also be appropriate to append a footnote clarifying the term ‘reasonable period 
of time’. 
 
4.  Estimation of export prices 
 
Ex-factory export prices are arrived at after making numerous adjustments. These 
include adjustments for taxes, discounts and rebates actually granted and directly related 
to the sales concerned, packaging costs, costs relating to the export and transportation of 
the product, costs charged for the product’s entry into the country, including transport, 
maintenance, insurance, loading and unloading and handling costs, and other unforeseen 
costs incurred from the commencement of transportation at the point of export until 
delivery to the buyer. Adjustments that are claimed by the exporters are examined by the 
Designated Authority. It is at the discretion of the authority whether to accept or reject   16
them.  Some of the specific problems indicated in the calculation of the export price are 
as follows. 
 
Constructed export price  
 
In cases where there is no export price or where it appears to the authorities 
concerned that the export price is unreliable because of association or a compensatory 
arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price has 
to be constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold 
to an independent buyer, or if the products are not resold to an independent buyer, or not 
resold in the condition as imported, on such reasonable basis as the authorities may 
determine (Antidumping Agreement, Art. 2.3).  The law stipulates that in such cases 
allowances for costs (including duties and taxes) incurred between importation and resale 
and for profits accruing should be made.  When a manufacturer performs all export 
functions (for instance, administration of exports and networking etc.) in-house, his 
export price reflects these costs and is comparatively high. On the contrary, when he sells 
to a related importer who performs all these functions on his behalf then the price does 
not reflect this cost and is comparatively low. Adjustments made in the price in these 
cases therefore result in anomaly penalising exports via related importers.  
 
This issue needs to be addressed as with increasing globalistion more and more 
exports are being undertaken via trading houses. Article 2.3 could thus be suitably amended, 
as suggested in the case of the normal value, to accommodate the possibility that the 
association between the exporter and the importer does not affect the export price. 
 
5. Fair  Comparison 
 
Article 2.4 stipulates  that ‘a fair comparison shall be made between the export 
price and the normal value’.  This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, 
normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the 
same time.  Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences 
which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, 
taxation, level of trade, quantities, quality, physical characteristics, currency conversion 
and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability. 
There are however many instances where authorities apply unreasonable rules at the 
expense of fairness. The issues that have been repeatedly raised by Indian exporters in 
antidumping investigations against them relate to the treatment of duty drawback, other 
indirect taxes and credit costs. 
 
Duty drawback  
 
If any interested party demands price adjustments because of a difference in 
physical characteristics or quantity and condition of sales, he/she shall establish the fact 
that the difference directly affected the market price or on the manufacturing costs and 
that the difference is quantifiable. However the investigating authorities at time do not 
permit the required allowances on unreasonable grounds. One such allowance is duty   17
drawback claims. This problem is particularly serious for developing countries where 
import duties are higher than in developed countries. In the  ‘Synthetic Fibres Polyester 
(from India) Case (1992)’ where the provisional dumping margins exceeded 100% as a 
result of the EC not taking into account duty drawback, the final margins reduced 
significantly when such allowances were made. However, in most cases authorities reject 
the claims for duty drawback adjustments. 
 
Detailed guidelines for duty drawback scheme including effective monitoring 
systems and procedures are laid down in Annexes II and III of the SCM agreement. But 
the problem is that such monitoring systems and procedures are not considered adequate 
by investigating authorities in developed countries. They insist upon the producers 
positively establishing that domestically purchased raw materials have at no times been 
used in exported finished goods. The EC for instance insists that  a duty adjustment is 
only granted provided two conditions are satisfied, first, it must be shown that import 
charges are borne by the like product and by materials physically incorporated therein 
and second, these import charges are refunded/ not collected when the product is 
exported to the community. Exporters’ find it extremely difficult to conclusively provide 
evidence with regard to the first requirement. This has become one of the most 
contentious issues from India’s perspective.  There are several instances where duty 
drawback claims made by Indian exporters had been rejected by the EC. In fact, in 7 of 
the 13 cases currently in force, claims for duty drawback adjustment were rejected by the 
EC. In the case of ‘Certain flat rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel’ two Indian 
companies claimed an allowance for such charges. These requests were partially granted 
to the extent that the above two requirements were satisfied. In the Polyster Staple Fibre 
case against India, the EC rejected the claim at the provisional stage due to lack of 
evidence. One exporter before the final determination submitted new information to 
support duty drawback claim but the Commission did not consider this claim on the 
ground that it was not submitted in time. In the ‘Certain Polyethylene Terephthalate 
case, the EC rejected the claim made by Indian companies on the import duties refund. 
The companies argued that the findings of the AD investigations were in contradiction 
with the findings in the parallel anti-subsidy proceedings in which the DEPB scheme was 
considered as an export subsidy that benefited the companies. The EC however changed 
its stance and argued that since CVD will be deducted from AD duties, any adjustment 
made in the normal value would amount to double adjustment. There are several other 
cases in which importers claims on duty drawback were rejected. These are for instance,  
Steel fasterners, Polyethylene Terephthalate Film  and Sulphanic acid cases also. In a 
recently concluded Polyster textured filament yarn (PTY) case against India, all the 
three investigated companies claimed a duty drawback adjustment. However the EC 
rejected the duty drawback adjustment claim made by all Indian exporters on the ground 
that there was no evidence that any import charge was borne by the like product when 
destined for domestic consumption. The exporters claimed the same adjustment under the 
Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme on post-export basis. The EC rejected this claim as 
well on the basis that companies failed to demonstrate the DEPB /Advanced License 
Schemes affect price comparability and that customers consistently pay different prices 
on the domestic market because of the benefits of the above mentioned schemes. The EC 
also rejected  the exporting producers argument that the requirement to demonstrate that   18
the input raw materials for production in the exporting country contains a duty 
component imposed an undue burden of proof. Two Indian exporters argued that in the 
context of the parallel anti-subsidy investigation the Commission had accepted the 
scheme as non-countervailable.. Therefore, in order to remedy this contradiction between 
the two proceedings the said allowance should have been granted. However the EC 
argued that each AD case is examined on the basis of its own factual circumstances 
which may differ from all other proceedings.  
 
The US Department’s practice is to evaluate duty drawback adjustment claims 
with a “two-part test” to determine (1) whether the import duty and rebate are directly 
linked to, and dependent upon, one another, and (2) whether the company claiming the 
adjustment can show that there were sufficient. Many a times exporters find is difficult to 
provide sufficient proof to satisfy both these requirements. In the Stainless Steel Wire 
Rod from India Case, the Indian Exporter Viraj could not  submit adequate evidence to 
meet these conditions in repeated administrative reviews. It was only when the company 
submitted all the documents which the Commerce requested to show a link between its 
claims for duty adjustments, its purchases of imported raw materials, its reported sales 
and its financial statements that  it was granted duty drawback claim. The Commerce 
stated categorically that relying on the Indian government’s predetermined import content 
for exported merchandise is an inadequate means of calculating and reporting duty 
drawbacks.  
 
The above discussion indicates the importance of addressing this issue.  It is 
important to have case-based information on the experience of exporters regarding certain 
allowances and examine how the law can be modified in the light of such experiences.  
 
6.   Dumping margin 
 
The WTO agreement stipulates  that, ‘the dumping margin shall be the amount by 
which the normal value exceeds the export price’. The existence of margins of dumping 
during the investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison 
of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable 
export transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis.  A normal value established on a weighted average basis 
might be compared to prices of individual export transactions if the authorities find a 
pattern of export prices, which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or 
time periods. Major problems noted in this stage of the calculation of dumping margin 
relate to zeroing of dumping margins and comparison of  weighted normal value with 




Zeroing of dumping margins 
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In those cases in which margins of dumping during the investigation phase are 
established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with  export 
prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis or by a comparison of normal value and 
export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis, average dumping margins are based on 
the average of all comparisons. However, in this process when the export price is 
substantially higher than the normal value i.e. dumping margin is negative, the authorities 
treat such sales as having zero dumping margin. By doing so, the authorities skew their 
calculations in favour of higher dumping margins. Prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, it was standard practice of some WTO Members to apply this method.  Because 
of pressure exerted by other WTO Members, Article 2.4.2 was adopted and WTO 
Members generally resorted to use of the weighted average method (comparing a 
weighted average normal value with a weighted average export price). However, within 
the weighted average method, some WTO Members applied a new type of zeroing: inter-
model zeroing. If, for example, model A was dumped while model B was not dumped, 
the Members would not allow the negative dumping of model B to offset the positive 
dumping of model A inflating the weighted dumping margin ascertained for the like 
product as a whole. In the Bed linen case against India, the Panel stated  
‘We recognise that Article 2.4.2 does not in many words prohibit zeroing. 
However this does not mean that the practice is permitted, if it produces results 
inconsistent with the obligations set forth in that Article as we believe it does. 
This is equivalent of manipulating the individual export prices counted in 
calculating the weighted average, in order to arrive at a weighted ‘ 
The Appellate Body supported this ruling. Dumping margins reduced 
significantly once the practice of zeroing was  dropped and the EU had to withdraw AD 
duty on cotton bed linen originated in India.  
 
In the US-Stainless Steel from Korea Case, the Panel ruled that the United States’ 
use of multiple averaging periods in the Plate and Sheet investigations was inconsistent 
with the requirement of Article 2.4.2 to compare a weighted average normal value with a 
weighted average of all comparable export transactions. The United States had divided 
the investigation period for the purpose of calculating the overall margin of dumping into 
two averaging periods to take into account the Republic of Korea’s won devaluation in 
the period November-December 1997, corresponding to the pre- and post-devaluation 
periods. The United States had calculated a margin of dumping for each sub-period. 
When combining the margins of dumping calculated for the sub-periods to determine an 
overall margin of dumping for the entire investigation period, the DOC had treated the 
period November-December, where the average export price was higher than the average 
normal value, as a sub-period of zero dumping—where in fact there was negative 
dumping in that sub-period. The Panel concluded that this was not allowed under Article 
2.4.2 
 
In view of the rulings given by various Panels, zeroing needs to be prohibited at all 
levels. Article 2.4.2, needs to be redrafted so as to provide that dumping margins should be 
based on comparisons, which fully reflect all comparable export prices.    20
 
Comparison of weighted normal value with individual export prices 
 
A normal value established on a weighted average basis may be compared to 
prices of individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices, 
which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods. A review 
of the antidumping proceedings indicates that in many cases export prices on transaction-
to transaction basis are compared with one estimate of normal value. In this process the 
exporter may suffer yet another disadvantage from the method of comparison. In the 
following example, the weighted average normal value is $10 (15+10+5/3). 
 
Table 4:  Comparison of weighted normal value with individual export prices: An 
Illustration  
Date of sale  Domestic price  Normal value  Export price  D.M. 
1 August  15  10  16  0 
10 September  10  10  12  0 
22 December  5  10  8  2 
 
Thus, 22 December exports though above the domestic price are nevertheless 
dumped because the export price happens to be less than the weighted average normal 
value. Along with zeroing, such practices also need to be reviewed and amended.  
   
The foregoing contribution has attempted a broad overview of the issues related to 
the calculation of dumping margins. The analysis is primarily based on the problems 
faced by Indian exporters in antidumping proceedings carried out against them in the US 
and EU. It shows that the use of constructed normal values and export prices, imposition 
of unrealistic conditions for granting relevant allowances that need be made to ensure 
comparability between export and unfair comparisons between export and normal values 
create a high degree of risk of artificial dumping.  There is need to strengthen the law to 
prevent its extensive misuse.   
 
II.   Injury 




The AD authorities must identify the domestic industry before addressing the 
injury issues. Domestic industry is defined by Article 4.  
It means ‘the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or those of them 
whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products’ (Article 4).    21
The law does not define the term ‘major proportion’. An analysis of the injury 
determinations made by the EC and the USITC shows that non- complainant firms are 
generally reluctant to co-operate.  In practice, therefore injury determinations are 
normally based on the data submitted by the complainants and the best available 
information. Since investigations may be initiated when domestic producers expressly 
supporting the application account for 25% or more of total production of the like 
product, injury analysis may also be carried out for  producers who account for as low as 
25% of the domestic production.  
 
A footnote clarifying the term ‘domestic industry’ may be appended.  For the purpose 
of injury analysis, domestic industry should be defined to include more than 75% of domestic 
production. 25% condition that is necessary for the initiation of AD investigations is not 




Scholars (see for instance Didier 2001) argue that the practice of excluding related 
party  is less tenable where these affiliates no longer import the like product from a 
dumping country but produce it in the importing country only. In Korea, producers who 
imported six months prior to the date of receipt of the application and those whose import 
quantity is insignificant are included in the definition of domestic producers. In countries 
with substantial presence of FDI, a number of producers are likely to be excluded from 




The law does not have any provision regarding the treatment of captive 
production. Authorities therefore can exercise their discretion in the treatment of captive 
production. The US statue has ‘captive production provision. Under this provision the 
USITC must focus its injury analysis on the free (merchant) market and potentially may 
find injury in the merchant market even if the industry as a whole is not experiencing 
injury. EC law has no captive production provision but in practice the EC normally 
excludes captive production from injury assessment. In the Hot rolled steel product 
originating in India case around 70% of the hot-rolled coils manufactured by EC 
producers was used in a captive market i.e. they were further transformed by the 
producers in an integrated process. The complainant claimed that two  separate markets 
should be distinguished and only the hot-rolled coiled sold o the free market was subject 
to the complaint. Exporting producers however suggested that the assessment of the 
market should include the captive market and the free market taken together. In support 
of this claim reference was made to the GIMELEC judgement of the European Court of 
Justice. (Case no. C-315-90 of 27.11.1991). In this ruling the Court referred to the 
following factors to rule out the existence of two separate markets:  (1) the product 
concerned was sold on the same market and used for the same purpose; (2) the 
community producers sold the product concerned both to related and unrelated customers 
and charged more or less the same price; companies on the downstream market used to   22
buy the product concerned not only from related Community suppliers but also from 
importers/unrelated producers.  However, the Commission considered that the separation 
between the free and the captive market is  in line with the requirement of the past 
practice.  Consequently the situation of the community industry in terms of the 
development of various economic indicators such as production, sales, market share and 
profitability was examined with respect to the free market.  
 
Japan however challenged the practice of ignoring captive production in injury 
analysis. In the US- AD measures on Hot rolled Steel Plates from Japan dispute case, 
Japan argued that the captive production provision of US law violates Article 3 and 4 of 
the ADA. The EC supported the US practice as a third party and argued that where a 
significant proportion of domestic production is for captive consumption, it is not 
inconsistent with the ADA to focus the analysis on the merchant market since it is there 
that the immediate injurious effect of the dumped imports takes place.  Developing 
countries like Chile, Brazil and Korea however supported the argument given by Japan. 
The Appellate Body  in this case ruled that Article 3.1 does not entitle investigating 
authorities to conduct a selective examination of a domestic industry. Rather where one 
part of an industry is the subject of separate  examination other parts of the industry 
should also be examined in like manner. It thus ruled that the authorities need to examine 
both the captive and the free market separately and argued that the US acted 
inconsistently with the ADA by not analysing the data for the captive market.  
 
It is therefore important to amend the agreement to categorically mention the 
treatment of captive production so that in future cases this loophole is not exploited in the 
injury analysis.  
 
Exports vs domestic sales 
 
Should exports be taken into account in the injury  analysis? The EC does not 
think so. In one of the cases investigated by the EC, Indian exporters argued that limiting 
the analysis of the community’s sales to the domestic sales in terms of volumes and 
prices does not comply with the provision of Article 3(4) of the WTO ADA on the 
ground that the agreement refers to total sales thus including exports. The Commission 
however argued that  Article 3(4) in conjunction with Article 3(1) and (2) of the WTO 
clearly refers to the evaluation of the impact of dumped imports on prices in the domestic 
market and on the situation of the domestic industry. Injury of the Community industry 
must be found to exist on the domestic market only and that the situation w.r.t. exports is 
therefore irrelevant. The above AB judgement on the Captive production provision has 
important implications for the treatment of export sales and needs to be taken into 
account while negotiating on this issue. 
 
Article 4 may be extended to include special provisions regarding treatment for the 
exports. 
 
2.   Injury indicators  
 
Methods used for injury determination may be a matter of grave concern. There is 
no mathematical formula for determining the existence of injury. The decision whether   23
the standard of material injury has been satisfied is essentially a matter of judgement 
about which few general principles can be stated. In a pioneer study Finger et al (1982) 
observed that the injury decisions are primarily motivated by political factors. Their 
findings were supported by a number of studies (Anderson 1993, Moore 1992, Tharakan 
and Waelbroeck 1994, Hansen and Prusa 1996, 1997 among others).  These studies 
suggest that political pressures matter a lot. For instance, two key House and Senate 
Subcommittees control the USITC’s budget. Empirical evidence suggests that industries 
with production facilities in the district of oversight members fare better at the 
Commission. Political pressures can also take the form of bias against certain trading 
partners. For instance, these empirical studies suggest that cases against Japan and non 
market economies are far more likely to result in duties. Strong lobbies also affect the 
decisions. For instance, the steel industry in the US fares remarkably well in the AD 
investigations due to strong producers’ lobby. Among economic factors, the larger the 
volume of imports and the larger the profit loss the greater is the chance of an affirmative 
decision.  Thus, much depends on how the authorities argue.  There is no scientific 
method of determining injury.  
  
We analysed movement of 11 economic indicators as examined by the EC in 12 
AD investigations against India. These are tabulated below. In almost all the cases, 
production, productivity, investment and capacity have gone up. Profits and employment 
are the two indicators that have  shown downward trends in most cases. Apparently 
injury assessment means confirming employment and profits are down. There is no 
formal economic analysis. Kaplan (1991) in an analysis of the USITC decision making 
process reaches the same conclusion.  
 
Table 5:  Case-wise summary of injury-assessment: EC investigations against 
Indian exporters  
Case  I  II  III  IV V  VI VII  VIII IX X  XI 
Synthetic  fibre  ropes  up N.C.  down    up up up down  down  up up 
Steel  fasteners  up Up  down  up     down down  up up up 
Potassium 
Permengnate 
down    up    up up up down  down    up 
Stainless  steel  wires       up  up   down    up 
Steel  ropes  up Up  down  up down N.C.   down  down  up up 
Flat rolled Steel 
products 
up   down  up down down up up down    up 
Certain  PET    N.C.   up    down   up   
Cathod ray Colour 
TV 
down   N.C.   down up    down    
PSF    down       down    
PET  Film  down  Up  down  up up up   down    up N.C.
Sulphanic  Acid  up Up  up  N.C.   up up down  N.C.  up N.C.
PTY  up Up  N.C.  up down down down down  down  N.C.  down
I=Prices, II=Stocks, III =Market Share, IV=Capacity, V=Sale, VI=Production, VII=Capacity utilization, 
VIII=Profit, IX=Employment, X=Productivity, XI=Investment; N.C. : No Change 
Source : Official Journals of the EU 
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Furthermore, Article 3.4 requires that the examination of the impact of the 
dumped imports on the domestic industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant 
economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry producing the 
like product in the importing country. It mentions 15 specific factors in this context. The 
scope of this obligation has been examined in four panel proceedings thus far. These are : 
Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup 
(HFCS) from the United States (Mexico – Corn Syrup) WT/DS132/R; Panel Report, 
Thailand-H-Beams; Panel Report, EC-Bed Linen; Panel Report, Guatemala-Cement II.   
All four Panels, strongly supported by the Appellate Body in Thailand-H- beams, held 
that the evaluation of the 15 factors is mandatory in each case and must be clear from the 
published documents. Every panel in the Agreement on Safeguards also has reached the 
same conclusion. It has thus been consistently held that the investing authorities are 
required to evaluate all the 15 factors described in Article 3.4.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance attached to these factors, the wordings of the 
provision suggest that these are merely illustrative factors. The law states  
‘The examination of the impact of dumped products.....shall include an 
evaluation of all economic factors including...... The list is not exhaustive....’.  
In the light of the Panel rulings, it is important to review these factors carefully. 
Only those factors that can be meaningfully evaluated for the subject product need to be 
included. For this it is important that a framework is developed for injury analysis. In the 
US-AD measures on certain hot rolled Steel products from Japan dispute case, the 
panel ruled that  
‘it would not be sufficient if the investigating authorities merely mentioned data 
for Article 3.4 factors without undertaking an evaluation of that factor.. ’ 
But an evaluation requires context and a well defined framework. The law 
however describes a wide array of economic factors without giving a proper framework 
as to how the authorities need to evaluate them. Many factors are systematically related. 
For instance, productivity may have negative relationship with employment. Similarly, 
the economic theory suggests that increased competition in the market results in fall in 
profits. This may not therefore be a sign of injury. Apparently, analysing 15 factors in a 
single framework is not practical. Furthermore, many of the Article 3.4 factors are 
applicable to the business enterprise as whole and cannot be examined product-wise in 
multi-product corporations (Bhansali 2002). These are for instance,  employment, wages, 
growth, ability to raise capital and investment. Since dumping margin is calculated on the 
product basis, injury should also be product-specific. These problems can be tackled if  a 
proper framework is developed for assessing injury.  
  
In this context, some scholars suggest that the injury standard for antidumping 
cases should be brought closer to the antitrust standard, which takes into account the 
behaviour's effect on the competitive structure of the industry as a whole, rather than the 
material injury it causes to petitioner domestic firms. The factors that have implication 
for the competition should therefore be included and evaluated  within a perspective of 
protecting competitive process.  
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However, there is little evidence of analogue between antidumping and 
competition laws (See Aggarwal 2002a for discussion). It is therefore a challenging task 
to evolve a suitable framework for injury assessment. Member countries may decide to 
set up a Working Committee to address this issue.   
 
One suggestion is that the wordings of the law may be modified. Footnote 9 of Article 3 
reads  
The term "injury" shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury 
to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation 
of the establishment of such an industry. 
 
It is suggested that Or could be replaced by  and.  It would result in stricter 
interpretation of injury. Injury would mean material injury that is likely to continue and 
would result in material retardation of the domestic industry. This will facilitate the 
evaluation of various economic indicators such as ability to raise capital, investments, 
stocks and productivity by providing context. Logically, antidumping duty imposition is 
justifiable if there is evidence that injury would persist and that this would retard the 
establishment of the industry. Showing injury during the investigation period alone 
cannot justify the imposition of ADD.  
 
It would also prevent initiating AD investigations on the basis of threat of injury 
alone. The law permits the application of AD measures in cases where a domestic 
industry alleges that it is not yet suffering material injury, but is threatened with material 
injury, which will develop into material injury unless anti-dumping measures are taken. 
Article 3.7 offers special provisions for a threat case. These are : (i)  a significant rate of 
increase of dumped imports into the domestic market indicating the likelihood of 
substantially increased importation; (ii) sufficiently freely disposable, or an imminent, 
substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially 
increased dumped exports to the importing Member’s market, taking into account the 
availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports; (iii) whether imports 
are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on 
domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; and (iv) inventories 
of the product being investigated. 
 
The Mexico – Corn Syrup case the Panel concluded that a threat analysis must 
also include evaluation of the Article 3.4 factors. The Panel was of the view that 
‘While an examination of the Article 3.7 factors is required in a threat of injury 
case, that analysis alone is not a sufficient basis for a determination of threat of 
injury, because the Article 3.7 factors do not relate to the consideration of the 
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry.…In our view, 
consideration of the Article 3.4 factors in examining the consequent impact of 
imports is required in a case involving threat of injury in order to make a 
determination consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.7.’  
Such statements are easy to make and any investigation based on threat of 
material injury will necessarily be speculative because it involves analysis of events that 
have not yet happened. It is therefore suggested that no injury decision should be based   26
on the ‘threat of injury alone’. In the PET flm case, Indian exporters pointed out that the 
community industry’s situation improved dramatically since the IP period and that the 
community was no longer suffering material injury. The EC argued that article 6(1) of the 
basic rule provides that information relating to a period after the IP should not normally 
be taken into account. On the basis of the jurisprudence of the Court, the commission 
examined developments in the PET markets during the  nine months period following the 
IP. It was found that prices increased continuously. Market share and sales also increased. 
However, it was concluded that if the ongoing proceeding was terminated, it was likely 
that dumped imports would rapidly regain market share and thus the case was made for 
the injury. No evidence was given to support the argument. Such issues may be addressed 
by introducing the above change in the wordings of the law. 
   
Price undercutting  
 
Most countries including EC (Vermulst and Waer 1992), rely for estimating 
injury mainly on price undercutting by dumped imports. The methodology is to compare 
weighted  average net sales price of the dumped imports on a model by model basis with 
the weighted average net sales price by community industry in the Community market. 
While calculating price undercutting, the EC practise zeroing practice on the model basis. 
Price undercutting are inflated because any negative amount by which the exporting 
producers’ price undercut those of the community industry were not offset with any   
positive amounts. In the Steel Wires case against India 12.7.1999 Indian exporters raised 
this issue  but did not get heard. In the  Polyester Staple Fibre Case again Indian 
exporters argued that it was wrong to exclude negative price undercutting. The 
commission confirms this but since no further arguments were put forward, the claim was 
rejected. In the PTF case, certain Indian exporters argued that the injury should be 
calculated on the like product and not on the comparable models. The arguement was 
based on the conclusions of the WTO Appellate body in the bed linen case ( 1.3.2001). 
The EC however argued that these conclusions were drawn in the context of dumping 
calculations and hence were not relevant in this case.   
 
It is however felt that the AB ruling has a wide implication and that in the light of 




Besides injury, it must also be demonstrated that the dumped or subsidized 
imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing injury.  Disentangling various 
causes of injury to domestic industry and  finding out that part of injury which could be 
ascribed to dumping is a complicated task. In the US- AD measures on certain Hot 
rolled steel production from Japan, the Appellate Body ruled that investigating authorities 
must make an appropriate assessment of the injury caused to the domestic industry by the 
other known factors. They must separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the 
dumped imports from the injurious effects of those other factors.  In the  United States - 
Wheat Gluten Safeguard and United States - Lamb Safeguard case, where the 
Appellate Body interpreted Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards - which is   27
substantially similar to Article 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement - to mean that 
authorities must separate and distinguish the effects of other factors and assess the 
"bearing", "influence", or "effect" that each factor has on the overall situation of the 
domestic industry. 
 
These rulings notwithstanding, there appears to be no serious attempt to 
disentangle the injurious effects of dumped imports from other sources.  It has been 
recommended above to constitute a working committee to look into injury-related issues. 
The same committee may be entrusted with the task of  the causal relationship-related 
issues.   
 
A recommendation of the WTO Committee ( WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping 
Practices - Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Anti-
Dumping Investigations - Adopted by the Committee on 5 May 2000, G/ADP/6 on Anti-
Dumping Practices) provides that injury should preferably be analysed over a period of at 
least three years. This period is often called the injury investigation period [IIP]. Such a 
relatively long period is needed particularly because of the causation requirement. While 
the industry must be suffering material injury during the regular investigation period and 
detailed injury margin calculations in the case of application of a lesser duty rule will be 
based on the data existing during the regular investigation period, the analysis of injury 
and causation needs a longer period in order to examine trend factors, such as those 
mentioned in Articles 3.4 and 3.5 ADA. The new Committee should examine  whether 
three years’ period is sufficient  for analyzing the causal relationship. There is evidence 
of positive relationship between economic downturn and the number of AD initiations in 
developed countries (see Aggarwal 2002b). Apparently, these countries accommodate 
import competition when the market is expanding but protect their market share when the 
rate of expansion slows. Thus injury may be associated with economic downturn. Three 
years period may fail to control for the business cycles. Aside from the injury period, the 
committee may also devise a formal economic analysis to disentangle the effect of 
various other factors in the trend analysis. What is required is some form of 
‘counterfactual estimate’ which would show what the situation of the domestic industry 
would have been if there were no dumping and then to compare it with the actual 
situation. Work done by Boltuck (1991) and others have proposed methods for such an 
analysis. It is time that ADA incorporates the requirement for some form of counter-




One of the most widely criticised provision in injury determination is that of 
cumulation. The WTO agreement permits  an investigating authority to accumulate 
dumped imports of a product from more than one country that are simultaneously subject 
to antidumping investigations. Using this provision, the authorities aggregate all like 
imports from all countries under investigation and assess the combined effect on 
domestic industry. Though WTO agreement states that the authorities may cumulatively 
assess …., antidumping legislation in almost all countries states that  the authority shall 
cumulatively assess the volume and effects of such imports, provided that the imports   28
compete amongst themselves and with products identical or alike to those imported 
which are manufactured in the country. In actual practice authorities follow the practice 
of cumulation in almost all cases.  
 
Until 1984, the use of cumulation was discretionary in the US. Only 13 percent of 
the anti-dumping cases were subject to cumulation between 1980-84. Injury decisions 
were made on a country-by –country  basis even if multiple countries were named. It 
meant that the authorities rarely found injury by reason of dumped imports unless the 
import volume was substantial. In 1984, due to aggressive lobbying by domestic 
industries, the US Congress amended the AD and CVD laws making it mandatory to 
cumulate imports across countries when determining injury.  Rather than being rare 
cumulation became the norm. Obviously, in the post 1984 period, there was a dramatic 
increase in the  use of cumulation provision. Between 1985 and 1994  75% of  the ITC 
decisions involved cumulation (Table 6). In the Uruguay Round this provision was 
included in the ADA.  
 
Table 6: Use of the cumulation principle: Analysis of USITC cases 
Final determinations  Affirmative determinations   
No Cumulation  Cumulation  No cumulation  Cumulation 
1980-84 205  30  22%  30% 
1985-1994 123  367  40%  51% 
Source Prusa (1998) 
 
Cumulation increases the likelihood of  affirmative findings. If the imports from 
individual countries are aggregated, the market share of investigated firms will rise and 
the impact of foreign impact will become more significant. This in turn will result in 
greater likelihood of affirmative findings. Table 6 shows that over the period from 1985 
through 1994, affirmative findings were made in 51% of cases with cumulation while 
only 40% of the cases without cumulation were successful.  Hansen and Prusa (1996) 
quantified the impact of this change in the statute by comparing outcomes in the pre 1984 
(1980-84) and post 1984 (1985-88) period. After controlling for other factors they find 
that cumulated cases were about 30% more likely to result in duties than non-cumulated 
cases. Their findings suggest that more than 50% of USITC affirmative determinations 
from 1985 through 1988 would have been negative without cumulation.  
   
Aside from this, cumulation also has what Hansen and Prusa (1996) called 
‘supper Additivity effect’. They observed that even if the market share effect is controlled 
by holding the market share  of defendant firms constant, aggregating over the exports of 
several countries itself increases the probability of an affirmative injury determination. 
Thus the greater is the number of small defendant firms (holding the market share 
constant), higher is the probability of a positive finding by the USITC. According to an 
example considered in Hansen and Prusa (1996), when 40 percent of imports are under 
investigation and a single country is involved, the probability of an affirmative injury 
finding is 0.60. But when the petition is filed against two countries with a cumulated 
market share of 40 percent, divided equally between them, the probability rises to .72. 
This change represents a 20 percent increase in the probability of affirmative action.   29
Extending the example to five countries, holding constant the market share of imports, 
the probability rises to .78 or by 30 percent. Tharakan, Greenaway and Tharakan (1998) ) 
confirmed this finding for the EC injury determination as well. They provide similar 
examples using the estimates for the EC. The probability of an affirmative finding rises 
from .92 for two countries to .98 for 3 countries, holding constant the market share of 
imports under investigation. Gupta and Panagariya (2001) explained this empirical 
finding using a theoretical framework. They suggested that the presence of a large 
number of exporters exacerbates the free rider problem, which leads every firm to invest 
less on defence and results in super additivity effect. Thus, cumulation has played a 
significant role in yielding a positive injury determination not only by increasing the 
market share of defendant firms but also due to super additivity effect of cumulation. 
Naming a multitude of small countries with very small import market share raises the 
probability of gaining protection because  it results in super additivity effect. This 
practice is likely to be primarily harmful for developing countries that constitute small 
fractions of the import market. 
 
To examine the use of cumulation in the post Uruguay Round Period,  we now 
analyse naming patterns in all AD duty orders currently in place  in the US and EU.  In 
the case of the US, several duty orders currently in effect are the result of pre-1995 period 
investigations. These cases are  analysed separately. Table 7 shows that the  WTO 
Agreement had a significant impact on the use of cumulation. While in the pre-WTO 
years multiple countries were named in around 25% of the cases initiated,  in the post 
WTO period  39% cases had multiple countries. Furthermore, naming patterns also 
changed with increasing number of cases having more than 3 named countries.  These 
patterns appear to be  more pronounced in the EU where multiple countries were named 
in 58% of the cases and  almost the same  proportion of cases involved more than 3. 
There were cases which involved ten to twelve countries. 
 
Table 7: Summary of naming patterns in the EU and US cases 
United States  European Union No. of named 
countries   AD cases  continued  
from the past 
Initiated in post 
1995 period 
 
2 11  7  8 
3 4  5  6 
4-7 4  9  14 
8-12 2  3  5 
Total cases naming 
multiple countries 
21 24  33 
Duties in effect 
(product-wise) 
86 62  58 
Source: Author’s computations based on data provided on USITC and EU websites  
 
Table 8 shows that in most US and EU cases involving India cumulation is 
applied. In the US, ten AD duties are in effect against India. In all these cases  multiple 
countries were named in the investigation process. In the EU, 13 AD duties are in effect 
currently. Cumulation was applied in ten of these 13 investigations.    30
 
Table 8: Summary of naming patterns in cases involving India  
Cases against India  US  EU 
Multiple countries  10  10 
Only India  0  3 
Total 10  13 
Sources: USITC and EU trade websites 
Thus under cumulation naming more countries has become a profitable strategy, 
particularly against developing countries. It needs to be recognised  a harmful practice.  
 
The USITC generally considers four factors when deciding whether to cumulate : 
(1) interchangeability between imports from different countries and between imports and 
domestic product, (2) overlap between the domestic product and the imported product in 
four geographical markets of the US; (3) similar distribution channels and (4) 
simultaneous presence of imports. These conditions are rather easy to meet and 
regardless of whether one country’s imports actually harm domestic producers, it can be 
lumped together with big exporters.  
 
For elaborating on the conditions provided in Article 3.3, a sentence could be added 
stating that significant differences in market share/ export volume trends over past years 
from different exporting countries indicate a difference in the conditions of the competition 
and the inappropriateness of cumulation.   
 
Besides, it calls for a SNDT provision for developing countries. We shall discuss 
it in Part IV. 
 
III  Other Procedural Issues 
 
1.  Initiation of antidumping case 
 
Condition   
 
The WTO agreement stipulates that an investigation shall not be initiated unless 
the authorities have determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support 
for, or opposition to, the petition expressed by domestic producers of the like product, 
that the application has been made "by or on behalf of the domestic industry."  The 
petition will be considered to be made "by or on behalf of the domestic industry" if it is 
supported by 50% of the industry expressing opinion and 25% of the total domestic 
production. In practice however, the authorities examine the share of the petitioners  in 
the  total domestic production and if it is established that the petitioners constitute 25% of 
the domestic production, the case is initiated. There is no procedure whereby it is 
ascertained at the time of initiation whether  there is dissemination of information 
regarding the petition among all the producers in the industry. No provision is made to   31
determine support/ opposition of producers in the industry before the case is initiated. 
Thus, only 25% of domestic producers can trigger protection affecting 100% of 
consumers. 
 
In the second submission to WTO (TN/RL/W/26) India has argued that domestic 
industries that are fragmented and have a very large number of producers face an 
enormous problem in initiating AD investigations because they find it difficult to meet 
the standing requirement contained in Article 5.4. This is particularly true in the case of 
goods produced in industries in the unorganised sector. On the basis of the above 
argument India has recommended to apply the sampling rule (footnote 13) to 25% 
condition also. 
 
To evaluate the significance of this argument, we have examined the market share 
patterns of all those firms that have filed AD cases in India from 1993 through 2001. 
Preliminary empirical evidence suggests that AD cases in India are filed by firms that are 
operating in highly concentrated domestic markets. In more than one-quarter of the cases, 
the industry had a sole producer.  In around 80% of the cases , the industry had one to 
four producers. In only 11 cases, the industry had more than 6 producers. What is more 
striking is the level of concentration among petitioners. In 90% of the cases the  number 
of petitioners was between one  and three . In those cases where there was only one 
petitioner, his average market share was 89.7%,. In the cases where the number of 
petitioners was 2 and 3, average market share was 62.7% and 76.6 % respectively. 
Clearly, the petitioners were the dominant producers in their industry. In around 49% of 
the cases there was a sole petitioner and on an average his share was 89.7%. Of the 97 
cases there were only 3 cases in which the number of petitioners exceeded 5.  
 
Table 9: Domestic market structure of industries subject to AD investigations 
No: of Producers/ Petitioners  No: of cases 
(producers) 
No: of cases 
(petitioners) 
Average market share* 
1  23 47 89.7 
2  11 22 62.7 
3 9  18  76.6 
4 12  4  59.3 
5 13  3  67.8 
6  3 0 - 
More than 6  11  3  - 
Total  82 97 - 
Note: * this information is based 83 cases 
Source: Government of India gazettes  
 
Table 10 shows the distribution of petitioners’ market share. This information was 
available for 83 cases. Of the 83 cases, 77 cases are such in which petitioners’ market 
share is 50% or more.  
 
 
Table 10: Distribution of petitioners’ market share 
Petitioners’ Market  Number of  Average market   32
share  cases  share of petitioners 
25-50 6  30.2 
50-75 20  61.3 
75-90 16  81.2 
90-100 41  97.4 
Source: Government of India gazettes  
 
This is in contrast with the findings for the US where unconcentrated industries 
initiated more than 50% of all dumping cases; at most, only one-third were initiated by 
highly concentrated industries (Hyun Ja Shin 1998). Moreover, empirical  evidence in the 
EU and US suggest that domestic industry concentration do not seem to have much 
influence on petition. It must however be observed that lobbying power is one of the most 
significant factor in determining affirmative finding.  
 
Thus India’s proposal may prove to be counter productive. It is likely to facilitate 
AD filing in developed countries where meeting necessary conditions for filing AD 
petition may be a contraint. In India, important constraints are very high legal cost of AD 
investigations, lack of expertise, weak lobbying power and free rider problem. Feinberg 
and Hirsch (1989) find that more  firms in an industry tend to lower the likelihood of 
petition which supports the effects of free rider problem. The the conditions for domestic 
industry standing need to be tightened to protect Indian exporters in the foreign markets.  
 
The current law may be abused where the non complaining firms do not express 
their opinion.  Thus we propose that Article 5.4 may be modified (see also Didier 2001) 
by clarifying that 
 
‘the application shall be considered to have been made ‘by or on behalf of the 
domestic industry ....if the domestic industry expressing either support or opposition to the 
application represents more than 75% of the total domestic production’. Domestic industry 
includes captive production, production for exports and production by parties related to 
exporters’. 
 
25% condition and the sampling condition should go. Sampling technique is 
frequently resorted to by advanced countries. Any bias in the sample selection may have 
the immediate effect on the outcome.  
 
Back to Back investigation: 
 
Repeated/ Back-to-back AD investigations in some countries on the same product 
originating in the same countries is an important issue particularly from a developing 
country point of view and needs to be addressed. As an illustration one may cite the 
synthetic fibre ropes case investigated in EU. In June 1997 an antidumping proceeding 
concerning imports of synthetic fibre ropes  originating in India was terminated without 
imposition of measures on the ground that a causal relationship between dumping and 
injury was not sufficiently established to justify the imposition of measures. In July of the 
same of the year, the Commission announced the initiation of a new AD proceeding 
against  this product on the ground that information made subsequently available to the   33
Commission contained sufficient prima facie evidence that the situation of the 
Community industry may have further deteriorated as a result of continued dumped 
imports from India. The Indian exporter raised objections to the opening of the 
proceeding. They argued that compared with the negative finding on causation made in 
the previous proceeding concerning imports of synthetic fibre ropes originating in India 
there were no changed circumstances to explain a different finding in the present case on 
the causal link between dumping and injury. However, the EC was convinced that it had 
reliable information to establish a causal link between injury and dumping in the present 
case. There was evidence that the market share of the subject exporter declined in the  
period of investigation from 4.1% in 1995 to 3.4% in 1996. The authorities however 
owed it to the previous AD proceeding which coincided with the period of investigation 
in this period. 
 
The EU is ready to agree to a separate provision in the draft implementation decision 
by making it harder for industry to bring back-to-back cases in a 365 days. However, we 
propose to have a separate provision in the Agreement to preclude the initiation of any 
investigation for a period of 365 days from the date of termination of a previous investigation 
on the same product from the same country.  
 
2.   Questionnaires 
 
Replying to questionnaires, some of which extend to hundreds of pages, 
constitutes a major burden, particularly for small and medium-sized exporters from 
developing countries. Exporters find the questionnaires too time consuming and 
complicated. It has been observed that in traditional user-countries questionnaires have 
become more and more complicated over time. Long and detailed questionnaires have 
harassment value. This is one possible reason why these firms choose not to participate in 
the AD investigations against them and instead allow the case to proceed using ‘facts 
available’ which always means much larger tariffs. Baldwin and Moore (1991) finds that 
the use of facts available nearly doubles the average US dumping margin from around 
35% to over 65%. It is therefore recommended to use simple questionnaires. This 
problem therefore needs to be addressed. The questionnaires should be as simple as 
possible, focusing only on the necessary information.  
 
It is proposed here that consideration should be given to a standard questionnaire. 
 
3.  Disclosure of information  
 
The WTO agreement stipulates that only non-confidential summaries of 
confidential information are available to the parties concerned. In principle this is to 
protect the companies’ interest.  However, this may be of little value to the defendants 
and complainants. Such a situation may lead to increased propensity to affirmative 
findings in dumping and injury determination. Tharakan and Waelbroeck (1994) argue 
that the EC is more susceptible than the USITC to non-economic factors due to the EC’s 
strict confidentiality rules where little information is revealed to parties. This makes it 
easier for political factors to influence the Commission’s decisions.   The situation may   34
be tackled by abolishing the strict confidentiality rule and the use of more technically 
sophisticated and economically relevant injury determination methods.  
 
The Thailand- AD duties on Angles ...and H Beams from Poland case brings 
out the important of a greater transparency in the system. In this case  the Appellate 
Body ruled that there is nothing in Article 3.1 which limits an investigating authority to 
have an injury determination only upon non-confidential information. ‘It permits an 
investigating authority making an injury determination to base its determination on all 
relevant reasoning and facts before it’.  This ruling makes it all the more important to 
ensure a greater transparency in the system.  
 
Some countries like USA and Canada have a system under which confidential 
information submitted by one interested party may be accessed by the attorneys of other 
interested parties under an Administrative Protective Order (APO). Under APO the counsel 
gets access to such information. However he is  first required to provide strict undertaking  of 
confidentiality (Tharakan1994). The attorneys cannot provide this information to their clients 
but they can use it to double check the correctness of the information as well as the use 
made thereof by the agency.  
 
Some scholars (Vermulst 1997) argue that this system is difficult to maintain for 
developing countries and might create substantial problems if information were ever 
leaked. However, most experts observe that it is clearly preferable for a greater 
transparency.   
 
4  Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
  
Lifting any restrictions of the role of panels  
 
Constraints of the role of panels distinguish the anti-dumping regime from other 
WTO regimes. Developed countries desperately required less interference with domestic 
decisions during the Uruguay Round. As a result, panels’ role is strictly limited compared 
with normal Dispute Settlement Procedure. Panels can do nothing if establishment of 
facts is proper and evaluation of those facts is unbiased and objective.  
 
A WTO panel in the  Guatemala-Grey Portland Cement from Mexico case ruled  
‘We consider that it is not our role to perform a de novo review of the evidence 
which was before the investigating authority in this case. Rather, Article 17 
makes it clear that our task is to review the determination of the investigating 
authorities. Specifically, we must determine whether its establishment of the facts 
was proper and the evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. In other 
words, we must determine whether an unbiased and objective investigating 
authority evaluating the evidence before it at the time of the investigation could 
properly have made the determinations made by Guatemala in this case. In our 
review of the investigating authorities' evaluation of the facts, we will first need 
to examine evidence considered by the investigating authority, and second, this 
examination is limited by Article 17.5(ii) to the facts before the investigating   35
authority. That is, we are not to examine any new evidence that was not part of 
the record of the investigation.’ 
Finger and Fung (1994) observe that the GATT dispute settlement process seems 
unlikely to provide discipline against the increasing number of AD cases. Both the legal 
and bureaucratic momentum of dispute settlement are towards the innocuous findings of  
procedural errors that can be lifted without the AD order in question. 
 
Another controversial issue is that the ADA allows different interpretations, 
which is against the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. One of the expected 
benefits for developing countries joining the WTO is to take advantage of multilateral 
mechanism to avoid any unbalanced bilateral negotiations with their powerful trading 
partners. However, it is faded due to powerless panels. Article 17.6 (ii) was added into 
anti-dumping agreement in the Uruguay Round. Since developing countries more focus 
on world trade than before and more developing countries are expected to join the WTO 
in foreseeable period, there will be more anti-dumping cases submitted to the DSB.  
 
It is therefore proposed to enhance the role of panels in the dispute settlement and 
reduce the discretion of importing countries’ authorities. The restrictions of the role of panels 
in article 17.6 (ii) should be reviewed. Any dispute arising from anti-dumping issue should be 




After a ruling, the prospect of an Article 21.5 “compliance” panel review (and 
possibly appeal) and Article 22 “arbitration” panel increases the incentives for foot-
dragging. Cotton bed case may illustrate this point. Following the DSB recommendations 
in March 2001 in this case, the EC withdrew ADD on bed linen originating in India by 
August 2001. While appreciating the steps taken by the EC, the Trade Commissioner of 
the EU said  
‘it shows the EU prudent use of the trade defence measures in particular against 
developing countries. This development dimension a constant and distinct feature 
of the EU trade policy is at the heart of the initiatives presented by the EU in the 
Doha Development Round... ’.  
However India was not satisfied with the implementation of the Panel ruling. She 
requested the establishment of Panel challenging the implementation of AB ruling. The 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) compliance panel  however  ruled in favour of the 
European Union. In February 2002, upon request by the Community industry a review 
had been initiated. India  raised this issue as well. However, the panel upheld the partial 
interim review also initiated by the European Union. It ruled that the provision 21.2 does 
not impose any specific or general obligation on Members to undertake any particular 
action. The partial interim review is expected to recommend (Ministry of Commerce, 
India website www.tc.nic.in)  imposition of higher duties on imports of cotton bed linen 
from India to the European Union. While the European Union had initially imposed 
definitive anti-dumping duty ranging from 2.6% to 17% on these imports from India, the 
partial interim review is likely to suggest imposition of duties of up to 26%. These rulings 
are likely to hit Indian exporters in a major way.    36
 
We therefore propose further reforms in the dispute settlement system that would 
limit post-ruling foot-dragging.  
 
Special and differential treatment provisions in this regard are discussed in Part IV.  
 
5 Sunset  Reviews 
 
Introduction of the ‘sunset review’ process of antidumping orders in the Uruguay 
Round was perhaps one of the most important reforms in the AD process. Pre-WTO 
GATT rules were relatively vague about when governments were required to terminate 
antidumping duties. This meant that duties could remain in place indefinitely. Under 
Article 11.3 of the WTO agreement all antidumping orders be terminated five years after 
their initiation unless the authorities determine in a review  that the expiry would be 
likely to lead to a continuation of dumping and injury. Sunset review was originally 
deemed friendly to developing countries. However, developing countries gain little 
because the AD measures under the law can be extended for successive new terms of five 
years if the authorities determine that the expiry of the duty would lead to recurrence of 
dumping and injury. This has led traditional users to renew measures almost indefinitely 
and they have in fact got an overwhelming proportion of anti-dumping measures in force 
AD orders of which had been made several years ago. In the US, out of 305 sun set 
reviews only 143 have been revoked. This constitutes 47% of the total reviews. AD is 
continued in 53% of the cases. There are several cases that have been continuing since 
the 1970s. Table 11 provides a year-wise distribution of the US AD duties currently in 
force. Of the 278 duties currently in force, 161 (58%) were ordered before 1996. In other 
words, these duties have been in place for more than one term. Of the 161 cases, 98 
(61%) cases are against non-OECD countries. Thus overwhelmingly large number of 
such cases are against non OECD countries.  
 
Table 11: Year-wise distribution of the US AD duties (country specific) currently in 
force 
Order date  No. of cases  currently 
in force  
No. of cases against 
non OECD  
Before 1983  10  1 
1983-86 22  20 
1987-1989 37  18 
1990-1992 35  25 
1993-1996 57  34 
1996-2002 117  98 
Total 278   
 
In order to demonstrate fairness and massively reduce the anti-dumping cases in 
force in which developing countries are mainly the targets, it is important to make this 
code effective. Article 11.2 states    37
‘....Interested parties shall have the right to request ......to examine whether the 
continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, whether the 
injury would be likely to continue  or recur if the duty were removed..’ 
Under the current system the subject matter of the review investigation is only the 
likeliness or recurrence of dumping and injury. A WTO Panel in the US-DRAMS’ from 
Korea case ruled   
‘....Mathematical certainty is not required but the conclusions should be 
demonstrable on the basis of the evidence adduced. This is as much applicable to 
a case relating to a prospect of recurrence of dumping as to one of present 
dumping’. With regard to injury the panel ruled ‘Article 11.2 provides for a 
review of whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duties 
were removed or varied (emphasis added). In conducting injury review the 
authority may examine the causal relationship between injury and dumping’. If 
the only injury under examination is future injury ....the authority must 
necessarily be examining that whether that future injury would be caused by 
dumping with a commensurately prospective timeframe’.  
Thus the Panel indirectly upheld that the current system should be replaced by a 
requirement of a new proceeding all over again.  
 
Article 11.3 could thus be amended by stating that continuation of AD measures is 
admissible only where all the three conditions for the imposition of definitive antidumping 
measures have been fulfilled.  
 
6.  Anti dumping duty: Lesser Duty Law 
 
The decision whether the amount of the antidumping duty to be imposed shall be 
the full margin of dumping or less is to be made by authorities of the importing member. 
The agreement (Art. 9.1) expresses preference for a lesser duty ; however, it does not 
make it mandatory. Member countries therefore use wide discretion in this matter as well. 
While in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and India this rule is not mandatory, the EU statue 
has made this rule mandatory. In the US and Canada, on  the other hand,  once injury is 
proved and its causal effect is established AD duty equivalent to the dumping margin is 
imposed. Many scholars however have expressed their preference for the lesser duty rule 
and have argued that it needs to become mandatory. 
 
The lesser duty rule implies that dumping duties should be less than the dumping 
margin and only high enough to remove injury. WTO Members, which apply a lesser 
duty rule in accordance with Articles 8.1 and 9.1, have to calculate injury margins. The 
ADA does not give any guidance on such calculation and arguably leaves its Members 
substantial discretion. Normally, injury margin  is calculated as the difference between 
the fair selling price due to the domestic industry and the landed cost of the product under 
consideration.  Landed cost for this purpose is taken as the assessable value under the 
customs Act and the basic customs duties.  More specifically, 
 
Injury elimination level is = selling price of the community industry + the profit 
shortfall + reasonable level of profit – price of the dumped products.    38
 
This calculation of the extent of injury itself is subject to several ambiguities. 
There is ambiguity in the calculation of the fair domestic price. Fair domestic price is 
calculated by projecting the actual cost at the optimum level of capacity utilisation. In 
doing so, the authorities use the actual price data for the whole industry and not for the 
most efficient units. This method gives upward bias to the fair domestic price for two 
reasons. First, the calculations are based on the information provided by the domestic 
producers. Two, in many cases, the industry has highly inefficient cost structure due to 
wrong location, smaller size, obsolete technology, high cost of electricity and waste of 
raw materials. No account is taken of the fact that the price difference can be caused by a 
host of factors other than dumping such as competitiveness, better policies of the 
exporters, and difference in quality. The more inefficient the industry the greater is the 
likelihood of higher injury margins. Thus the system primarily protects inefficiency.  The 
choice of profit shortfall and reasonable levels of profits are also at the  discretion of the 
authorities. Injury elimination levels can be inflated by giving higher values to these two 
parameters. It is therefore quite possible that injury margins are higher than dumping 
margins and that even if the lesser duty rule is applicable, dumping duties are the full 
dumping margins. The effect of lesser duty rule is likely to be insignificant unless there is 
an unambiguous methodology of calculating injury elimination level. 
 
Table 12:  Summary of injury and dumping margins  
Case  No. of exporters 
Investigated (incl. 
Residual category) 
No. of exporters for 
whom injury margin 
> dumping margin 
Column 3 as a  
percentage of col. 2 
Synthetic fibre ropes  2  0  0 
Steel fasteners  4  3  75 
Potassium Permengnate  1  1  100 
Stainless steel wires  11  8  73 
Steel ropes  3  3  100 
Hot-rolled Flat steel  2  0  0 
Certain PET  5  1  20 
Cathode ray Colour TV  1  1  100 
PSF 3  2  67 
PET Film  7  7  100 
Sulphanic Acid  2  2  100 
PTY 5  5  100 
Total 48  33   
 
To test the above hypothesis, we examined injury and dumping margins in almost 
all the cases which were investigated in the EU against Indian exporters between 1998 
and 2002 and which resulted into duties. Table 12 summarises the patterns. For 33 of the 
48 firms
2 ( 69%)  investigated in 12 cases, injury was found to be higher than the 
dumping margin. In 6 out of the 12 cases, injury levels were higher than dumping 
margins for all exporters. The rule appears to have benefited exporters in only three cases 
(Synthetic fibre ropes Hot-rolled Flat steel and Certain PET). One must also refer to 
Table 15 provided in Part IV below. It shows that the distribution of ADD imposed 
                                                 
2 It included the category of residual exporter firms.   39
against Indian exporters in the EU is more highly skewed than that in the US. Apparently 
the lesser duty rule in the EU is not very effective. 
 
The objective of this exercise is not to suggest that lesser duty rule should not be 
made mandatory. Rather, it suggests that in the absence of a non-ambiguous methodology 
for calculating injury elimination level, the lesser duty rule may not be effective.  
 
IV  Special and Differential Treatment (SNDT) 
1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘special and differential treatment’ refers to GATT rights and privileges 
given to developing countries, but not extended to  developed countries. The concept of 
special and differential treatment in the GATT evolved from debates in the 1960's as to 
how the growth and development of developing countries was best facilitated by trade 
rules. The term itself derived from a reference in the 1973 Tokyo Round Declaration 
which recognized the importance of the application of differential measures in 
developing countries in ways which will provide special and more favourable treatment 
for them in areas of negotiation where this is feasible.  
 
The inclusion of SNDT in GATT reflects a long history of calls by developing 
countries for special treatment in global trade arrangements. No principles applying 
specifically to developing countries existed in the GATT at the time of its inception. 
Moreover, GATT was dominated by the developed countries and these countries were 
not receptive to the idea of forging a link between trade and development. The first 
attempt to accommodate developing countries’ concerns was made in 1954 through 
Article 18 (Whalley, 1999). Developing countries however felt that their trade concerns 
were not being effectively addressed in the GATT. In 1965 they succeeded in getting Part 
IV also incorporated into GATT articles. Part IV introduced a development dimension 
into GATT. It introduced the notion of non reciprocity in tariff negotiations for 
developing countries and thus  made it possible to grant preferential treatment to 
developing countries in international trade rules. This was essentially an effort in the 
direction of making GATT more acceptable to developing countries. 
 
  Part IV of the GATT did not provide for a GATT Article 1 exception for 
developing country trade preferences, although it did contain the first formal statement in 
a GATT legal text of the principle of non-reciprocity. In 1968 the developing countries 
succeeded in establishing a Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) under the auspices 
of UNCTAD. In 1971, a GATT waiver from MFN obligations was granted after the US 
agreed to it. The 1971 Waiver from Article 1 (MFN) was a temporary arrangement, 
initially for a period of 10 years, under which developed countries could grant tariff 
concessions to developing countries on a non reciprocal basis. 
 
In the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), developing succeeded in getting ‘Enabling 
Clause’(1979) incorporated in the GATT. The Clause established the principle of 
differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries. It provided for: (i) the 
preferential market access of developing countries to developed country markets on a non   40
reciprocal, non discriminatory basis; (ii) 'more favourable' treatment for developing 
countries in other GATT rules dealing with non-tariff barriers (iii) the introduction of 
preferential trade regimes between developing countries; (iv) and the special treatment. 
This Clause made the 1971 GSP waiver permanent. It also introduced the idea that 
special and differential treatment is not a permanent right. Developing countries would at 
some point graduate from special and differential treatment as they grew and developed. 
In the Tokyo Round a number of  the codes that were negotiated contained Special and 
differential treatment provisions. The declaration launching the Uruguay Round 
contained a clear and unequivocal reaffirmation of special and differential treatment as a 
principle of the trading system, It had become a part of the system of trade rules. While 
negotiating on complex WTO disciplines, developing countries sought comforts in this 
provision. Special benefits were offered in almost every agreement and were readily 
accepted by developing countries even if in many agreements they were ad hoc in 
formalisation. 
 
Despite a long history of efforts by developing countries for SNDT, there has 
been an intense debate among scholars as to whether it really is worth the developing 
country effort to drive towards reinvigorating SNDT, or whether to focus negotiating 
efforts elsewhere. One school of thought suggests that SNDT provisions are not the best 
way to safeguard developing countries’ interests and that any drive towards strengthening 
these provisions would involve huge opportunity cost in terms of sacrifice of substantial 
gains that may be achieved by focusing on more concrete negotiations. Some scholars 
belonging to this school  opine that SNDT reflect token compensation offered to 
developing countries for their agreeing to complex WTO disciplines that are tailored to 
suit the interests of developed countries while others have expressed their doubts on the 
importance of  these provisions. They have criticised these provisions on the theoretical 
grounds and have advocated to narrow them. In support of their argument they cite 
several studies that have examined the benefits that GSP schemes have yielded for 
developing countries. The picture that emerges is that benefits seem to be modest in 
aggregate, and are more important for some countries than others (see for instance, 
Karsenty and Laird 1987 and McPhee 1989). There are no serious studies on the post 
Uruguay Round SNDT provisions and the initial indications from the first five years of 
operation of Uruguay Round decisions still provide an incomplete picture both on use of 
SNDT provisions and their impact. However,  it is felt (Footer 2001) that there has been a 
trend towards stricter and narrower interpretation of SNDT provisions making them 
ineffective in protecting developing countries’ interests. These arguments 
notwithstanding several  scholars (see for instance, Michlopolous 1998) argue that so 
long as there is a gap in economic capacities and levels of development of WTO 
members SNDT will be required. Giving more regards to developing countries is very 
important for world trade and world’s stability. The challenge is to more carefully 
rationalize these provisions and to elaborate on them. Developing countries must defend 
their interests in the new round of multilateral trade negotiation. Leaving these provisions 
to the discretion of developed countries  would  invite skepticism  to the benefits of these 
provisions.  
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2.  Conceptual justification for SNDT in the Antidumping Agreement 
 
There are several conceptual premises underlying the provision of SNDT in the 
WTO agreements.  Several scholars have discussed theoretical underpinnings of SNDT 
arrangements in GATT in detail ( see for instance, Michalopoulos 1998 , Whally 1999). 
This paper argues that there are special motivations for providing  such treatment in the 
ADA.  
 
A central problem for the developing countries in respect of possible AD 
measures against their exports is that their home market prices for domestically 
manufactured products are in most cases higher than those in their export markets.  This 
home market price distortion is largely due to inefficient cost structures  which result 
primarily from the production conditions under which firms in these countries operate. 
These include, high cost of capital, labour market conditions, labour  laws, poor 
infrastructrual facilities and bad governance. It is, therefore,  not a sound policy to rely on 
home market prices/ production costs as normal values in dumping investigations against 
developing countries. The normal value of all exports should be based on international 
prices for the goods concerned and not on home market prices / production costs. During 
the Kennedy Round the developing countries raised this issue and proposed a footnote to 
Article 2 (d)  of the 1967 Code that would have allowed for reference to third country 
export prices instead of prices in their home country whenever they were alleged to be 
dumping. The proposal was however rejected due to strong objections by the developed 
countries who finally ‘tailored the 1967 Code to suit their interests’ (Kufuor 1998). In 
1970 a GATT working committee  was established to examine the special problem of the 
developing countries under the 1967 Code. Developing countries again raised the basic 
problem in adhering to the 1967 Code. Though the working Party admitted that a solution 
to the problem would have to be based on the recognition that in the case of the 
developing countries it was not reasonable to use home market prices/ production costs as 
normal values in AD investigations, it concluded that a compromise on that matter was 
not possible at the time. It also pointed out that under Article 2 (d) of the 1967 Code 
prices for like products exported third countries could be used for price comparison when 
there was an unusual market situation in the exporting country.  In the final analysis it set 
out concession in Article 15. However, no elaborations on Article 15 were made in 
subsequent rounds. Against that background, it becomes important in the Development 
Round of negotiations to give due recognition to ‘the special situation’ of developing 
country members when considering the application of AD measures under this 
agreement. 
 
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that though the  cases reported by low 
and middle income countries have increased, the number of cases reported against them 
are still larger. Table 13 provides details on AD actions by targeted country group. It 
shows that in the early 1980s, around 60% of the reported cases were against OECD 
countries. Nearly 22% cases were reported against the upper income group of developing 
countries. Low and middle income country-groups together constituted around 12% of 
the cases. In the late 1980s, these patterns remained the same. In the early 1990s, 
however, there was a quantum jump in the number of cases initiated against low- and   42
middle-income countries. While in the late 1980s, only 17.5% of the cases were reported 
against them, in the early 1990s, their share doubled to 34%. It rose further to 40% in the 
late 1990s. More than 22% cases were directed against upper income developing 
countries. Taken together, developing countries were targeted in around 62% of the 
cases.  
 
Table 13: Initiation of AD investigations by affected-country: 1980-2000 
Number of cases   


















































Table 14 shows the patterns of AD duties currently in force in the US and the EU. 
These patterns reveal the extent of victimisation of developing countries! While in the 
US, two-thirds of the AD duties currently in force are against developing countries, in the 
EU over  90%  of such duties are against these countries. Antidumping has thus become 
properly speaking a developing countries’ issue. 
 
Table 14 : Patterns of AD duties currently in force : United States and European 
Union 
(number) 
 US  EU 
Developed 94  10 
Developing 184  184 
Total 278  194 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
The developing countries have embarked on structural reforms to their 
economies, in the recent past. The Uruguay Round further resulted in massive reduction 
of tariffs. These programmes could be seriously threatened by AD investigations targeted 
against them by developed countries.  To protect the interests of developing county 
Members and help them integrating their economies globally, it is important to elaborate 
on constructive remedies that may be granted to them by this Agreement.   43
 
Restraining the use of AD measures by developing countries is yet another reason 
to grant special  treatment to these countries. An empirical study carried out at ICRIER 
(Aggarwal 2002b) documents a positive relationship between the use AD measures 
against developing countries and AD filings by  them. This suggests that AD actions 
against developing countries motivate them to use similar policies against their trading 
partners. The use of AD measures helps them in creating capacity to take such actions 
and thus posing retaliation threats to counter such activities against them. The capacity to 
retaliate may in turn have dampening effects on AD activities of trading partner. 
Blonigen and Bown (2002) in an empirical  analysis of the determinants of the US AD 
behaviour, observed that retaliation capability of trading partners have had dampening 
effects on the US AD activity. In view of this, it may be argued that as long as the 
traditional users continue to use it against the developing countries, AD instrument will 
be used by developing countries to have the ability to hit back ( see also Vermulst 1997).  
One may like to suggest that increased AD familiarity and  ability across developing 
countries may ultimately help put the brakes on AD use by traditional users. However, 
this may also result in AD wars reversing hard won trade liberalisation gains. This may 
therefore prove to be a  costly strategy to restrain the AD use. The use of AD actions is 
still not widespread among developing countries.  If they continue to become targets of 
such activities irrespective of whether by developed or other developing countries, they 
will be motivated to use it themselves.  
 
Finally, after MFA comes to an end in 2005, there is likely to be stupendous 
increase in AD cases against developing countries. It is therefore important to negotiate 
SNDT in the next Round to safeguard their interests. 
 
3  SNDT Treatment and the Antidumping Agreement 
 
The SND treatment in the ADA is enshrined in article 15. It reads, 
‘It is recognised that special regard must be given by developed country 
Members to the special situation of developing country Members when 
considering the application of AD measures under this Agreement. Possibilities 
of constructive remedies provided for by this agreement shall be explored before 
applying antidumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of 
developing country Members.’  
Article 15 thus requires developed countries to give special regard to the situation 
of developing countries when considering the application of AD measures but does not 
make any specific provision for addressing how should they do it. It is therefore not 
surprising that the developing country members are of the view that  developed Members 
do not comply with Article 15 when imposing anti-dumping duties. (G/ADP/W/416 dated 
8 November 2000, G/ADP/M/15 dated 14 March 2000, G/ADP/M/16 dated 20 
September 2000, G/ADP/M/17 dated 9 April 2001, G/ADP/M/18 dated 21 November, 
2001).  India  raised this issue in both the DSB cases in which it was  an affected party,.  
 
The Panel in European Communities – Antidumping Duties on Imports of 
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India admitted that Article 15 imposes no obligation to   44
actually provide or accept any constructive remedy that may be identified and/or offered. 
It also pointed out that Article 15 does not require that ‘constructive remedies’ must be 
explored but rather that the  possibilities of such remedies must be explored and the 
explorations may conclude that no such possibilities exist.  The Panel however suggested 
that the exploration of possibilities must be undertaken by the developed country 
members. It was thus of the view that ‘Article 15 does impose an obligation to actively 
consider, with an open mind, the possibility of such a remedy prior to the imposition of 
an anti-dumping measure that would affect the essential interests of a developing 
country.’  The panel however did not come to any conclusion as to what might constitute 
‘constructive remedies provided for under this agreement’.  
 
The Panel in the ‘United States – Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on 
steel plates from India’ opined that the first sentence of Article 15 imposes ‘no specific 
or general obligation on developed country Members to undertake any particular action. 
The Panel did not agree with India that this ‘mandatory provision does create a general 
obligation , the precise parameters of which are to be determined based on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case’. The panel held that ‘Members cannot be expected 
to comply with an obligation whose parameters are entirely undefined. The Panel also 
disagreed with India’s view that special regard must be given throughout the course of 
the investigation. It was of the view that it refers to the final decision whether to apply a 
final measure.  
 
The above discussion clearly suggests that Article 15 of the Agreement on the  
implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 is 
operationally ineffective. Though it is a mandatory provision, the modalities for its 
application need clarification. SNDT is widely accepted by all Member States to deal 
with the vulnerability of developing countries in the free trading system. But this issue 
has not been well addressed in the anti-dumping regime. Article 15 is too general to be 





The Secretariat identifies two types of  SNDT provisions in WTO agreements: 
These are as follows. 
 
A.  Exceptions to rule to which developing countries may take recourse to; 
B.  Conduct or actions to be undertaken by developed country Members for 
developing country members. 
While A constitutes provisions of flexibility of commitment, actions, and use of 
policy instruments, B comprises of  provisions under which WTO members should 
safeguard the interest of developing country member and provide them technical 
assistance. To make SNDT provisions effective in the antidumping regime it is important 
that there are negotiations on  both types of provisions.   45
 
A.  Exceptions to rule to which developing countries may take recourse 
to 
 
De minimis level: Dumping margin 
 
Deminimis dumping margin is fixed at 2%. Many scholars propose to raise it to 
5% for developing countries and 8% for the least developed countries. To evaluate the 
impact of raising the de minimis dumping margin to 5% we examined dumping margin 
figures provided by the USDOC and EC in final determination of AD cases investigated 
in recent years. For the US, Lindsey (2000) provides a detailed database of company-
specific Antidumping Duty rates in all final determinations from 1995 through 1998 and 
it may be recalled that ADD rates imposed by the USDOC are full dumping margins. For 
the EU, we had information on country-specific AD duties currently in force. In cases 
where there are more than one exporter, our database provided the duty range specifying 
the minimum and maximum duty for the exporters within the subject country. For our 
analysis we considered the maximum duty imposed in a given country. One must note 
here that in the EU lesser duty law is applicable which means that actual dumping 
margins could in fact be greater than ADDs. ADDs set lower limits for dumping margins 
and thus serve as a good proxy for dumping margins in this analysis.  Table 15 
summarises the available information. It shows that even if de minimis margin is raised to 
10%, it will not have a significant impact on the use of AD measure. In the EU, in only 
10 out of 113 country specific cases, ADD is less than 10%. In the US, less than one fifth 
of the exporters faced less than 10% ADD.  In the EU, more than 50% of ADDs are 
above 25%. The distribution is more highly skewed in the US where 65% of the duties 
are above 25%.  
 





No. of country specific duties 
currently in force 
 
US 
No. of company specific duties 
between 1995 and 1998 
2%- 5%  2  10 
5-10 8  10 
10-25 46  17 
Above 25  57  67 
 113  104 
Source: Author’s computation based on the information provided by the EC and Lindsey (2000) 
 
For examining the issue further, we examined dumping margins calculated for 
Indian companies by AD authorities in the EU and the US. Data on dumping margins was 
compiled from the official documents of these countries. Table 16 shows the distribution 
of company-specific dumping margins calculated by the EC and USDOC in cases 
investigated and found affirmative against India. In most cases , dumping margins are 
above 10%.    46
 
Table 16: Summary of dumping margins calculated by the USDOC and EC in AD 






2%- 5%  0 0 
5-10 4 1 
10-25 14 7 
Above 25  28 7 
Total 46 15 
                   Source : Author’s computation 
 
This paper therefore argues that it is not appropriate for developing countries to 
spend time and energy in getting the de minimis dumping margin raised. 
 
De minimis: import shares  
 
De minimis import shares under the Antidumping Agreement  are 3% and 
collectively 7%. Though the objective of introducing this condition is that the exporter 
accused of dumping should have a significant market share, experts criticise the law for 
such low standards of dominance. The threshold are much lower than those used by the 
competition authorities for defining ‘dominant position’ (30% or 40% in general). They 
argue that if dominance is defined in a specific way for domestic competition, the same 
criterion should be applied to foreign competition as well  (Hoekman and Mavroidis 
1996).  No special or differential treatment is accorded to developing countries. As far as 
de minimis import shares under ASCM are concerned, developing countries enjoy 4% 
and collectively 9% while there is no accurate proportion for developed countries. As far 
as de minimis import shares under Agreement on Safeguard are concerned, developing 
countries enjoy 3% and collectively 9% while no de minimis provision for developed 
countries. One may like to argue therefore that SNDT should be granted to developing 
countries in the ADA also. There is however economic justification also for granting 
SNDT to developing in the threshold levels of imports shares. In general, individual 
shares held by exporting developing countries in developed country Members’ markets 
are very small. Their import shares exceed the de minimis threshold due to the system of 
cumulation. SNDT provision in the de minimis in imports may therefore help in   
restraining the use of ADD against developing countries. Following the existing 
literature, we offer two suggestions in this regard. 
 
One, the thresholds for executing negligible imports should be based on market 
share rather than on share of total imports. 
 
Two, A sentence could be added to Article 5.8 of the WTO Agreement stating that 
‘no collective account will be made of dumped imports from developing country Members 
holding less than 3% of the importing members’ consumption’.  
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This would mean that the countries with less than 3% of market share will 
automatically be excluded from the purview of AD investigations. This raises a pertinent 
question as to how effective will these reforms be? For addressing this question one 
needs to examine the individual market share of investigated firms from developing 
countries in developed country markets. Blonigen (2003) has complied a unique database 
on US antidumping investigations which provides firm-level data on all foreign firms that 
were involved in any U.S. antidumping investigation initiated from 1980 through 1995 
and received at least a preliminary firm-specific antidumping (AD) duty. Most of the data 
come from Federal Register notices of the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC) and the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the U.S. This database 
provides information on market share of US domestic producers, subject firms and other 
firms. We obtained this information and summarized in Table 17  below. It shows that in 
around 50% cases, the share of developing country firms had been less than 3%. One can 
therefore conclude that  an introduction of this clause is likely to yield substantial benefit 
to developing countries.   
 
Table 17: Distribution of market shares held by developing countries subject to AD 
actions in the US : 1980-1995 









It has been proven that anti-dumping investigations are harmful for parties 
affected no matter what final results are. There is evidence that AD petitions have a 
profound impact on imports even if they do not result in duties (Staiger and 
Wolak,1989;Prusa,1992). Staiger and Wolak (1994) found that imports fall dramatically 
during the investigation period regardless of the case ’s ultimate outcome. Legal scholars 
often refer to this as the “harassment ”effect of an AD investigation. Using extremely 
disaggregated trade data,  Blonigen and Prusa (1998) found that AD actions have a very 
large effect on imports. When an AD dispute results in duties or is settled, on average 
import quantities fall by almost 70 percent and import prices rise by more than 30 
percent. Interestingly, even when an AD dispute is ultimately rejected,the scrutiny has a 
significant impact on trade. The data reveal that even when the case is rejected imports 
fall by about 20 percent. The Synthetic Fibre Rope case against Indian investigated in 
the EU may illustrate this point further. In June 1997,  an AD investigation concerning 
synthetic fibre ropes originating in India was terminated without imposition of measures. 
In July 1997 a new AD proceeding was initiated. The period of investigation in this 
proceeding was from 1 July 1996 to 31 May 1997 which coincided with the period of 
earlier proceeding. It was observed that even if no AD measure resulted from the earlier 
AD proceeding,  importers of the Indian exporter had declined by 8%. 
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It is necessary to establish a mechanism to prevent such damages to developing 
countries since they can not afford them. Following the existing literature, it is 
recommended here that consultation before anti-dumping investigation is procedurally 
practical. Under this system, developed countries should inform the developing country 
involved of the facts of violation of anti-dumping laws and request them not to continue 
their violation prior to the initiation of investigations. As a response to the request from 
the complaining developed country, the developing country may correct its violation if it 
believes the claim of the complaining country is reasonable. If there is no agreement 
reached by two sides within a fixed period, the complaining country may set out 
investigation and follow what the authorities can do according to the existing procedure. 
This additional procedure will benefit both sides. Developing countries can get a chance 
to correct their aggressive conducts and possibly avoid an expensive lawsuit. Developed 
countries can solve dumping problems more efficiently and effectively. 
 
B.   Conduct or actions to be undertaken by developed country members 




Greater emphasis on instruments to strengthen developing country institutional 
capacity. The main differences between developed and developing countries are not in 
the trade policies they should pursue but in the capacities of their institutions to pursue 
them. This means that S&D provisions related to technical and financial assistance as 
well as longer transition periods (which are linked to institutional reform and capacity 
building) should be emphasised. Explicit legally binding commitments regarding 
technical and financial assistance need to be obtained. Legal obligations developing 
countries have assumed in the WTO agreements need to be balanced by legal 





Legal fees shall be conditionally shouldered by losing developed countries and 
expertise support should be available when developing countries face anti-dumping 
cases. Heavy financial burden is the root that developing countries have not been 
positively participating in anti-dumping lawsuits. If a developed country initiates an anti-
dumping investigation against a developing country and finally the complaints are not 
justified, the legal fees in this case should be shouldered by the losing party. Generally it 
is fair and easy to be accepted by developed countries. If this proposal is adopted by the 
next round of negotiation, developing countries likely get rid of any hesitation to defend 




The complex procedure of anti-dumping regime, like other regimes under the 
WTO, makes developing countries difficult to use it as both a complaining party and a   49
defending party. They are in sharp shortage of human resource and financial support. Not 
surprisingly their response rate is very low and their anti-dumping charges are always not 
justified according to the AAD 1994. 
 
Providing professional expertise aid is critical developing countries to participate 
in anti-dumping actions. There should be a special training program for developing 
countries. Especially when they face anti-dumping actions or they intend to set up their 




The overall objective of the international community should be a more 
meaningful and real provision of S&D treatment through appropriate instruments to 
countries that truly need it. SNDT may be linked to the level of development in 
developing country. One possibility would be to extend SNDT for all low and lower 
middle income countries (based on the World Bank definition) while considering the rest 
on a case by case basis. 
 
Legal assistance and dispute settlement 
 
Most observers note that developing countries have been more active in WTO 
dispute settlement.  Of the 10 AD dispute settlement cases so far, 7 have been initiated at 
the request of  developing countries. This greater participation is typically traced to the 
legal reforms ushered in by the DSU, notably the “right” to a panel and automatic 
adoption of panel reports. However, econometric evidence suggests that developing 
countries have not won greater concessions ( more favourable outcomes) under the WTO 
than under GATT. Developed country complainants have become significantly more 
likely to secure their desired outcomes under the WTO, while poor complainants have 
not. It is observed that the gap between developed and developing countries in winning 
concessions from a defendant owes to their differential rates of securing early settlement. 
In general, defendants tend to offer the greatest concessions in consultations, or at the 
panel stage prior to a ruling. It is at this stage that developed countries exact concessions 
and developing countries do not. It is not surprising therefore that they are panel more 
disputes notably against developed countries. We submit that more attention needs to be 
directed at helping developing countries make more of consultations, as well as more of 
negotiations at the panel stage prior to a ruling. Since  developing countries are relatively 
disadvantaged in this regard due to lack of their capacity, they require assistance prior to 
litigation. This also constitutes a constructive remedy.  
 




It would require drafting of regulations to fill gaps in the antidumping agreement, 
to address issues where the agreement explicitly offers members choices between   50
different approaches. Several ambiguities in the legal provisions such as a number of 
allowable adjustments with limited interpretation; the use of constructed normal and 
export values and unrealistic adjustments use of surrogate country methodology for non-
market economies, asymmetrical comparisons between the export and normal values 
introduce bias in favour of finding positive dumping margins. Determination of injury 
m a r g i n  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  e v e n  m o r e  s e v e r e  a m biguities and is highly discretionary. The 
administrative procedure is considered highly confidential increasing the risk of its 
misuse. It is therefore  necessary to introduce reforms in the system to minimise misuse 
of the law. The procedure of determining dumping should be made more transparent to 
minimise the risk of positive bias in favour of finding dumping. In addition, the injury 
standard for antidumping cases should be improved. Procedural aspects need be 
addressed and SNDT provisions should be strengthened. To minimise the manipulation 
of the law for protectionist purpose and to limit discretionary powers of the authorities, 
more explicit rules should be developed and definitions of different concepts used in the 
process should be  given clearly.  
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